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Criminal Deterrence:
A Review of the Literature†
Aaron Chalfin and Justin McCrary*
We review economics research regarding the effect of police, punishments, and work
on crime, with a particular focus on papers from the last twenty years. Evidence in
favor of deterrence effects is mixed. While there is considerable evidence that crime is
responsive to police and to the existence of attractive legitimate labor-market opportunities, there is far less evidence that crime responds to the severity of criminal sanctions. We discuss fruitful directions for future work and implications for public policy.
(  JEL J64, K42)

1. Introduction

(better employment opportunities) or sticks
(more intensive policing or harsher sanctions) is a first-order policy issue.
The standard economic model of criminal
behavior draws on a simple expected utility
model introduced in a seminal contribution
by the late Gary Becker. This model envisions crime as a gamble undertaken by a
rational individual. According to this framework, the aggregate supply of offenses will
depend on social investments in police and
prisons as well as on labor-market opportunities that increase the relative cost of time
spent in illegal activities.
Using Becker’s work as a guide, a large
empirical literature has developed to test
the degree to which potential offenders are
deterred. The papers in this literature fall
into three general categories. First, a number of papers consider the responsiveness
of crime to the probability that an individual is apprehended. This concept has typically been operationalized as the study of the
 articular
sensitivity of crime to police, in p

T

he day-to-day work of individuals
employed in law enforcement, corrections, and other parts of the criminal-justice system involves identifying, capturing,
prosecuting, sentencing, and incarcerating
offenders. Perhaps the central function of
these activities, however, is deterring individuals from participating in illegal activity
in the first place. Deterrence is important
not only because it results in lower crime
but also because, relative to incapacitation,
it is cheap. Offenders who are deterred from
committing crime in the first place do not
have to be identified, captured, prosecuted,
sentenced, or incarcerated. For this reason, assessing the degree to which potential offenders are deterred by either carrots
* Chalfin: University of Pennsylvania. McCrary: University of California, Berkeley and NBER.
†
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article page and view author disclosure statement(s).
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police m
 anpower or policing intensity. A second group of papers studies the sensitivity of
crime to changes in the severity of criminal
sanctions. This literature assesses the responsiveness of crime to sentence enhancements,
three strikes laws, capital-punishment
regimes, and policy-induced discontinuities
in the severity of sanctions faced by particular individuals. The third group of papers
examines the responsiveness of crime to
local labor-market conditions, generationally
operationalized using either the unemployment rate or a relevant market wage. This
literature seeks to determine whether crime
can be deterred through the use of positive
incentives rather than punishments.
The papers in each of these literatures
can be viewed as measuring the degree to
which individuals can be deterred from participation in criminal activity. Each of the
literatures is vast and it is not unreasonable
to suggest that each could merit a separate
review. A challenge remains to characterize
the pattern of the empirical findings and
explain why individuals appear to be more
responsive (and thus more deterrable) along
certain margins than along others. In this
article, we provide a brief review of each of
the three literatures introduced above with
the intention of rationalizing several apparently divergent findings.
We are not the first to review the deterrence literature. Indeed, in last decade we
count a number of comprehensive reviews
on the subject including, but not limited
to, Levitt and Miles (2006), Tonry (2008),
Durlauf and Nagin (2011), Nagin (2013),
and Chalfin and Tahamont (forthcoming).
We attempt to differentiate our review in
several ways. First, we have tried to synthesize research carried out by economists, as
well as criminologists. In this goal, we are
not alone. However, we are hopeful that by
highlighting in the JEL research from criminology that is typically unknown to economists, we will help to further integrate the

two disciplines. Second, interest in deterrence research has multiplied rapidly over
the last few years, with a number of important studies having been published in the last
year or two alone. Accordingly, we have done
our best to include references to the newest and most cutting-edge research. Finally,
in this review, we cover a topic that is often
omitted from reviews of the deterrence literature—the role of labor markets in deterring
crime via “carrots” rather than “sticks.” The
remainder of the paper is laid out as follows:
section 2 considers research on the effect
of police on crime, section 3 considers the
effect of prison and/or sanctions on crime,
and Section 4 considers the responsiveness
of crime to local labor-market conditions.
Section 5 concludes.
2.

Theories of Deterrence

Deterrence is an old idea and has been
discussed in academic writing at least as far
back as eighteenth-century treatises by Adam
Smith (1776), Jeremy Bentham (1789), and
Cesare Beccaria (1764). There are three core
concepts embedded in theories of deterrence—that individuals respond to changes in
the certainty, severity, and celerity (or immediacy) of punishment. Interestingly, in the
criminological tradition, deterrence is often
characterized as being either general or specific, with general deterrence referring to the
idea that individuals respond to the threat of
punishment and specific deterrence referring
to the idea that individuals are responsive to the
actual experience of punishment. Economics
prefers different terminology, reserving the
term deterrence for what the criminologist
calls general deterrence and describing specific deterrence as a change in information or,
perhaps more exotically, a change in preferences themselves. In this section, we briefly
characterize the way economists have formalized these concepts. In 
general, economic
theories of deterrence have focused more
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heavily on certainty and severity. However,
recent writing has increasingly characterized
deterrence as part of a dynamic framework in
which offender behavior is sensitive to their
time preferences (Polinsky and Shavell 1999
and Lee and McCrary forthcoming).
2.1 Economic Models of Crime
The earliest formal model of criminal
offending in economics can be found in
Becker’s seminal 1968 paper, “Crime and
Punishment: An Economic Approach.” The
crux of Becker’s model is the idea that a rational offender faces a gamble. He can either
choose to commit a crime and thus receive a
criminal benefit (albeit with an associated risk
of apprehension and subsequent punishment)
or not to commit a crime (which yields no
criminal benefit but is risk free). The expected
cost of committing a crime is a function of
the offender’s probability of apprehension, p
 ,
and the severity of the sanction that he will
face upon apprehension, f. To be more specific, the individual can be said to face three
potential outcomes, each of which delivers a
different level of utility: (1) the utility associated with the choice to abstain from crime,
U nc; (2) the utility associated with choosing
to commit a crime that does not result in an
apprehension, Uc  1; and (3) the utility associated with choosing to commit a crime that
results in apprehension and punishment,
U c2. In such a formulation, the individual
chooses to commit a crime if, and only if, the
following condition holds:
    > Unc
  .
(1)	(1 − p) Uc  1  + p Uc2
That is, crime is worthwhile so long as its
expected utility exceeds the utility from
abstention.1

1 The “if and only if ” holds if we maintain that the case of
(1 − p) Uc1
    + p Uc2
   = Unc
  implies no crime, an unimportant
assumption we make henceforth to simplify discussion.

7

In addition to the clear role played in this
model by the probability of apprehension, p,
the formulation also suggests the importance
of two additional exogenous factors that
  . Crime becomes
could influence U 
 c2 and Unc
more attractive when the disutility of apprehension is slight (e.g., less unpleasant prison
conditions) and it becomes less attractive
when the utility of work is high (e.g., a low
unemployment rate or a high wage). Becker
operationalizes the disutility associated with
capture using a single exogenous variable,
f, which he refers to as the severity of the
criminal sanction upon capture. Typically, f
is assumed to refer to something like a fine,
the probability of conviction, or the length of
a prison sentence.2 To a large degree, then,
government maintains control over U c2.
The utility associated with abstaining
from crime, U nc, is principally a function of
the individual’s ability to derive utility from
non-illicit activities. In practice, this is typically thought of as the wage that can be
earned in the legal labor market. When the
legal wage rises, U ncrises, thus reducing the
relative benefit of criminal activity. It is fair
to say that while government maintains some
control over U nc, it does so to a lesser extent
than it does over the utility of punishment,
U c2.
Using these ideas, Becker rewrites (see
footnote 16) the expected utility confronting
an individual contemplating crime as
(2)	
EU = pU(Y − f )  + (1 − p) U(Y),
where 
Yrepresents the income associated with getting away with crime.3 In this
2 In principle, 
fcan be a function of many different
characteristics of the sanction including the length of the
sentence, the conditions under which the sentence will be
served, and the degree of social stigma that is attached to a
term of incarceration, all of which are likely heterogeneous
among the population.
3 As Becker is careful to say, income “monetary and
psychic.”

8
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formulation, crime occurs if and only if
EU > Unc
  
. Equivalently, we can define
an indifference point, Y  ∗, such that crime
occurs if and only if Y
 > Y  ∗. It is easy to see
that
U( Y  ∗ )  − U  
|U( Y    − f )  − Un  c  |

p
1−p

nc
____________
(3)	   
  
   =  ___  .
∗

Several important ideas are embedded
in (3). First, for the individual to elect to
engage in crime, the gain relative to its loss
must exceed the odds of capture. Dividing
the numerator and denominator of the left
side by U ncyields a natural interpretation,
in terms of percentages. Consider a criminal opportunity where capture is n
  times
as likely as not. Crime occurs if the anticipated percent improvement in utility associated with getting away with it is more than
ntimes as large as the anticipated percent
reduction in utility associated with apprehension. Second, an increase in p
  unambiguously reduces the likelihood of crime, as this
increases the right-hand side of (3). Third,
an increase in funambiguously reduces the
likelihood of crime as long as U
 ′( ⋅ ) > 0, as
this decreases the left-hand side of (3).
Under risk neutrality, the equation (3)
simplifies. Define aas the income associated
with abstaining from crime, i.e., U
 (a) = Un  c;
define 
c = f − b > 0as the effective cost
of punishment. Further define income,
Y = a + b and Y  ∗  = a + b  ∗, where bis the
criminal benefit and b 
 ∗is the criminal benefit at which the individual is indifferent
between crime and abstention. Then equation (3) reduces to
p
	b  ∗  = c  ___ .
1−p

This simplified version of the Becker model
is the starting point of the dynamic analysis
in Lee and McCrary (forthcoming).
A somewhat different focus can be found
in Ehrlich (1973), where the notion of the

opportunity cost of engaging in crime is
front and center. Perhaps unsurprisingly,
labor economists have found it particularly
attractive to view crime as a time-allocation choice, and this type of formulation is
found in several prominent papers including Lemieux, Fortin, and Frechette (1994);
Grogger (1998); Williams and Sickles (2002);
and Burdett, Lagos, and Wright (2004),
among others.4
The typical time-allocation model of crime
considers a consumer facing a constant market wage and diminishing marginal returns
to participation in crime. This consumer
maximizes a utility function that increases in
both leisure (L) and consumption (C), where
consumption is financed by time spent
engaged in either legitimate employment
) at a market wage (w
) or time spent
(hm
  
in crime (h c) with a net hourly payoff of r.
The consumer’s constrained optimization
problem is to maximize his utility function,
U(C, L)
, subject to the consumption and
time constraints:
(4)	
C = w hm
    + r hc    + I
(5)

L = T − hm
    − hc  .

In (4), consumption is shown to be equal
to an offender’s legitimate income plus his
 is the indinon-legitimate income.5 In (5), T
vidual’s time endowment and leisure is the
remaining time after market work and time
spent in crime is accounted for.6 The parameter 
rreflects the criminal benefit but it
4 For further details, see Gronau (1980).
5 Irepresents nonlabor income.
6 Grogger assumes that the returns to

crime diminish as the amount of time devoted to criminal activity
increases—i.e., there is a concave function r( ⋅ ) that
translates hours spent participating in crime into income.
Diminishing returns implies that those engaging in criminal activity first commit crimes with the highest expected
payoffs (lowest probability of getting caught and highest stakes) before exploring less lucrative opportunities.
However, this need not be true.
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also reflects the costs of committing crime,
namely the risk of capture and the expected
criminal sanction if captured. In other words,
rcan be thought of as the wage rate of crime,
net of the expected costs associated with the
criminal-justice system. In this way, criminal
sanctions drive a wedge between the consumer’s productivity in offending and his
market wage, in turn, incentivizing market
work over crime.7
An interesting question in both Becker’s
model and Ehrlich’s model is whether individuals are more deterred by increases in p
or f. Becker addresses this in a straightforward way by asking whether the expected
utility of crime is decreased more by a small
percent increase in por an equivalent percent increase in f. This makes sense because
participation in crime should be monotonic
in its expected utility. Becker’s analysis
shows that p
 is more effective if and only if
U″( ⋅ ) > 0, i.e., if and only if individuals were
risk preferring.8 If individuals are averse
to risk, increasing fis more effective than
increasing p
 , and if individuals are risk neutral, then f and pare equally effective. Becker
notes (footnote 12) that this conclusion is the
opposite of that given by Beccaria regarding
the effectiveness of punishment versus capture, and that the conclusion is similarly at
odds with contemporaneous views of judges.

7 In order for an individual to commit any crime at all,
there are two necessary and sufficient conditions. First,
the marginal return to the first instant of time supplied to
crime must exceed the individual’s valuation of time (in
terms of how much consumption the person would be willing to forgo for more time) when all time is devoted to nonmarket, noncrime activities. Second, the marginal return to
crime for the first crime committed must exceed the individual’s market wage. Thus, those who can command high
wages or those who place very high value on time devoted
to nonmarket/noncriminal uses will be the least likely to
engage in criminal activity.
8 Note, however, the observant criticism of Brown and
Reynolds (1973), showing that this clean conclusion is the
result of the modeling assumption that the baseline utility
is that of getting away with crime.
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The model of Lee and McCrary (forthcoming) emphasizes the dependence of this
conclusion on the time preferences of the
individual.9 Intuitively, it seems like it would
be hard to deter an impatient individual
using a prison sentence, since most of the
disutility of a prison sentence is borne in the
future. Lee and McCrary propose modeling
crime using a modification of the basic job
search model in discrete time with an infinite
horizon. Risk-neutrality is assumed, yet individuals in this model have very different
responses to the capture and punishment.
In their model, criminal opportunities are
independent draws from an identical “criminal benefit” distribution with distribution
function F
 (b). The individual learns of an
opportunity each period and must decide
whether to take advantage of it. If the individual engages in crime and is caught, she
is imprisoned for Speriods, where Sis an
independent draw from an identical sentence-length distribution. As in the Becker
model, capture occurs with probability 
p.
If the individual abstains from crime, she
obtains flow utility 
aand faces the same
problem the next period. If she commits
crime and is not caught, she obtains flow utility a + band faces the same problem next
period. Finally, if she commits crime and is
caught, she obtains flow utility a − cfor S
periods, before confronting the same problem at the conclusion of her sentence.
The criminal benefit at which the individual is indifferent between crime and abstention is given by
p
1−p

(6) b  ∗  = c  ___  
+ ν{c  ___
 
   + p ∫b  ∗   (1 − F(z)) dz},
p
1−p

∞

9 Further details regarding the Lee and McCrary model
are given in McCrary (2010).
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  s
where ν = E[∑ S−1
s=1  δ  ] is a summary parameter governing how the distribution of
sentences affects decision making and δ is
the discount factor.10,  11
As in Becker’s static model, crime is
reduced by increases in pand increases in c.
The added feature of this model, however,
is that crime is also reduced by increases in
sentence lengths, and this behavioral mechanism is modulated by time preferences.
As is intuitive, patient individuals are quite
responsive to increases to sentence lengths,
but impatient individuals show much more
muted responses. In the limit as the discount factor approaches zero, the individual is arbitrarily more responsive to capture
than to punishment. The Lee and McCrary
model thus provides a simple way to reintroduce older ideas regarding the importance of
celerity into a Becker model.12
Ultimately, the models proposed by Becker
and Ehrlich yield three main behavioral predictions: (1) the supply of offenses will fall as
the probability of apprehension rises, (2) the
supply of offenses will fall as the severity of
the criminal sanction increases, and (3) the
supply of offenses will fall as the opportunity
cost of crime rises. In other words, behavioral changes can be brought about either
using carrots (better employment opportunities) or sticks (criminal-justice inputs). The
following section connects these core predictions to the empirical literatures that have

10 For example, if we take Sto be geometric, i.e., S has
support 1, 2,  … , ∞and P
 (S = s) = q (1 − q)  s−1, where q is
the per period release probability, then standard results
using infinite series show that ν = (1 − q) δ / (1 − (1 − q)δ).
Interestingly, this shows that under a geometric distribution for sentence lengths, reducing the probability of
release is equivalent to increasing the individual’s patience.
11 Equation (6) is not an explicit equation for b  ∗, but it
can be viewed as defining an implicit function. We can use
numerical methods to solve for b 
 ∗(e.g., Newton’s method
works well), and comparative statics are straightforward
using the implicit function theorem.
12 For related modeling ideas from criminology, see
Nagin and Pogarsky (2001), for example.

sought to test whether these predictions hold
in the real world.
2.2 Perceptions and Deterrence
Because economic models of offending
are microeconomic models that make predictions about individual behavior, our discussion of deterrence would be incomplete
without a discussion of how individuals
perceive risks and, especially, whether risk
perceptions mirror reality. Given the scope
of this review, our discussion of perceptions
is necessarily brief. We direct the reader to
an excellent review of this literature by Apel
(2013) for a more detailed accounting of the
perceptual-deterrence literature.
Perceptual deterrence is important because
the vast majority of the empirical-deterrence
literature operationalizes Becker’s model
of crime by studying the responsiveness of
crime to particular policy variables, such as
the number or productivity of police or the
punitiveness of sanctions. This approach
was initially borne out of the inadequacy of
data needed to test the microfoundations of
the Becker model, but has the advantage of
having generated a dense literature that is
practical and policy-relevant. Given that the
literature studies the effect of policy variables,
an important intermediate outcome and
indeed a precursor to identifying deterrence
is the extent to which potential offenders are
aware that policy has changed (Waldo and
Chiricos 1972, Nagin 1998, and Apel 2013).
Apel (2013) characterizes the link between
actual and perceived deterrence as involving
a series of considerations that include both
threat communication, the degree to which
a change in the certainty or the severity of a
sanction is communicated or advertised, and
risk perceptions, the individual’s perceived
risk of being apprehended and punished.
Crucially, risk perception is not assumed to
be stable and indeed an important literature has arisen that seeks to understand how
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offenders update risk perceptions in response
to experience (see Apel and Nagin 2011 for a
comprehensive review on the subject).
Ultimately, one of the most important questions for perceptual-deterrence
research is the degree of correspondence
between actual and perceived risks. If perceptions closely mirror reality, then using
policy shocks to learn about the magnitude
of deterrence is straightforward. However,
to the extent that changes in policy often
go unnoticed by potential offenders, the
outcomes of policy research will tend to
be of limited value in studying deterrence.
Consider, for example, a policy that increases
the number of undercover police officers
who are assigned to patrol a city’s transit system. Assuming that policy is unannounced
and, even if it is announced, that the news
does not easily trickle down to potential
offenders, it is difficult to imagine how
deterrence will accrue. It may well be that
the policy begins to be noticed by offenders
as they hear about cases in which undercover
officers have made arrests or if they have an
acquaintance who has been arrested in this
way. However, it seems likely that such information will generate deterrence only via a
substantial temporal lag. Indeed, it seems
likely that a highly visible change in the number of uniformed officers or, alternatively, a
well-advertised policy to increase the number of undercover officers, will generate a
greater deterrence effect, even if the actual
intervention is no different.
The recent literature that links actual and
perceived risks is relatively small. Important
recent work includes that of Kleck et al.
(2005) and Kleck and Barnes (2013), who
conducted a telephone survey of 1,500 adults
in fifty-four large urban counties in the
United States. They asked each individual to
estimate case clearance rates, the probability
of serving time in prison, and maximum sentence for several different serious felonies.
Comparing perceived risks to actual risks,
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they found little evidence of any correlations,
a finding that extends to police manpower
as well. Research by Lochner (2007) using
the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth
(NLSY) comes to a qualitatively similar conclusion reporting evidence of a significant,
albeit weak, relationship between actual and
perceived risks of apprehension. Likewise, in
an application to drug use, a very common
crime resulting in arrest, MacCoun et al.
(2009) report that individuals living in states
that have decriminalized marijuana often do
not have any awareness of this and continue
to believe that they can be jailed for marijuana possession. These studies are characterized by Apel (2013) as being discouraging
for deterrence research. However, as each
of the studies surveyed the general population, most of whom are uninvolved in crime,
such research may have poor external validity. The best evidence on perceptions among
a sample of active offenders comes from
Lochner (2007), who reports that NLSY
youth who self-report criminal involvement
do, on average, have more accurate perceptions about arrest risks than noncriminally
involved youth.
A second strain of research considers
whether offenders change their risk perceptions in response to a past arrest. One flavor of
this research has compared risk perceptions
among individuals who reported more frequent arrest conditional upon offending (i.e.,
less successful offenders) to individuals who
reported fewer arrests per offense (i.e., more
successful offenders). This literature tends to
find robust evidence of an association between
more frequent arrest and a higher perceived
probability of capture (Paternoster and
Piquero 1995, Piquero and Pogarsky 2002,
Pogarsky and Piquero 2003, and Carmichael
and Piquero 2006). A parallel literature has
found that risk perceptions are also informed
by the experience of acquaintances (Piquero
and Pogarsky 2002). Unfortunately, there are
a number of conceptual issues that make this

12
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literature difficult to interpret. Most notably,
since these associations arise from cross-sectional data, it is not possible to discern cause
from correlation. In particular, it is plausible
that more successful offenders have lower
perceived arrest probabilities for reasons that
are a function of personality and largely unrelated to experience. In response to this concern, a more recent literature uses panel data
to measure “updating”—the idea that individuals change their prior risk perceptions on
the basis of whether or not they are apprehended in an earlier period. This literature
has also tended to find robust evidence that
risk perceptions are sensitive to actual experience (Pogarsky, Piquero, and Paternoster
2004; Pogarsky, Kim, and Paternoster 2005;
Matsueda, Kreager, and Huizinga 2006; and
Anwar and Loughran 2011). Several more
specific findings from this literature are
worth noting. First, while perceptions are
responsive to experience, offending is not
always responsive to perceptions, implying
that at least a portion of offending may be
idiosyncratic and perhaps undeterrable in
a stable policy regime. Second, less experienced offenders are especially sensitive to
the experiences of peers, which is sensible
as they may not have sufficient history upon
which to draw conclusions. Third, there is
evidence that the general public, along with
less frequent offenders, tend to overestimate
their arrest risk and adjust their risk perceptions downward as they offend and recognize
that the risk of apprehension is lower than
they previously believed. An important corollary to this is that risk perceptions are more
sensitive to experience early in one’s criminal career, with the deterrence value of an
arrest declining with experience (Anwar and
Loughran 2011).
Broadly speaking, the perceptual-deterrence literature provides several reasons to
be optimistic that meaningful deterrence
effects can exist and can be particularly
salient among younger offenders who have

yet to commit to a criminal career. The
best available evidence suggests that the
experience of arrest does lead to an increase
in the perceived likelihood of being apprehended for a future crime. What is less
clear is whether perceived risks change in
response to policy inputs that have more diffuse impacts and whether advertising sanctions can be a sufficiently credible threat—a
proposition we discuss in further detail in the
subsequent empirical section of this paper.
2.3 Deterrence versus Incapacitation
Generally speaking, there are two mechanisms through which criminal-justice policy
reduces crime: deterrence and incapacitation. When by virtue of a policy change individuals elect not to engage in crime they
otherwise would have in the absence of the
change, we speak of the policy deterring
crime. On the other hand, a policy change
may also take offenders out of circulation as,
for example, with pretrial detention or incarceration, preventing crime by incapacitating
individuals. The incapacitation effect can be
thought of as the mechanical response of
crime to changes in criminal-justice inputs.
While deterrence can arise in response to
any policy that changes the costs or benefits
of offending, incapacitation arises only when
the probability of capture or the expected
length of detention increases.
The existence of incapacitation effects
has profound implications for the study of
deterrence. In particular, while research that
considers the effect of a change in the probability of capture will, generally speaking,
identify a mixture of deterrence and incapacitation effects, research that considers
changes in the opportunity cost of crime is
more likely to isolate deterrence. Likewise,
while research on the effect of sanctions typically results in a treatment effect that is a
function of both deterrence and incapacitation, clever research designs have been used
to identify the effect of an increase in the
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severity of a sanction that is unlikely to result
in an immediate increase in incapacitation.
For each literature discussed in this paper,
we provide a discussion of the degree to
which empirical estimates can be interpreted as providing evidence of deterrence
as distinct from incapacitation and, in some
cases, other behavioral effects. However, it is
important to note that deterrence is itself a
black box. In order to empirically observe a
behavioral response of crime to a particular
policy level, it must be the case that potential offenders perceive that the cost of committing a crime has changed (Nagin 1998,
Durlauf and Nagin 2011, and Nagin 2013).
Moreover, the behavioral response of crime
will depend on the accuracy of those perceptions. To wit, an intervention that successfully convinces potential offenders that the
expected cost of crime has increased, regardless of whether this is actually the case, will
likely reduce crime. The challenge for cost-effective public policy is to optimally trade off
between police and prisons so as to maximize
perceptual and, as such, actual deterrence.
3.

Police and Crime

Becker’s prediction that the aggregate
supply of crime will be sensitive to society’s
investment in police arises from the idea that
an increase in police presence, whether it
is operationalized through increased manpower or increased productivity, raises the
probability that an individual is apprehended
for having committed a particular offense. To
the extent that potential offenders are able to
observe an increase in police resources and
perceive a correspondingly higher risk to
criminal participation, crime is expected to
decline through the deterrence channel.
Empirically, the challenge for this literature is that changes in the intensity of policing are generally not random. As a result, it is
difficult to identify a causal effect of police on
crime using natural variation in policing. An
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additional, more conceptual issue is that the
responsiveness of crime to police may also
reflect an important role for incapacitation.
This arises from the idea that police tend
to reduce crime mechanically, even in the
absence of a behavioral response, by arresting offenders who are subsequently incarcerated and incapacitated.13 The extent to
which investments in police are cost effective
depends, in large part, on the degree to which
police deter rather than simply incapacitate
offenders. In this section, we consider the
responsiveness of crime to both police manpower and police tactics, broadly defined. For
each literature, we discuss the challenges with
respect to both econometric identification as
well as interpretation of the resulting parameters as evidence in favor of deterrence.
3.1 Police Manpower
A large literature has used city- or statelevel panel data and, recently, a variety of
quasi-experimental designs to estimate the
elasticity of crime with respect to police
manpower.14 This literature is ably summarized by Cameron (1988), Nagin (1998),
Eck and Maguire (2000), Skogan and Frydl
(2004), and Levitt and Miles (2006), all of
whom provide extensive references.
The early panel-data literature tended to
report small elasticity estimates that were
rarely distinguishable from zero and sometimes even positive, suggesting perversely
that police increase crime.15 The ensuing
13 In this context, deterrence can arise either from a
general decrease in offending or from a shift towards less
productive but correspondingly less risky modes of offending—for example, a shift from robbery to larceny.
14 This elasticity can be thought of as a reduced-form
parameter that captures both deterrence effects as suggested by neoclassical economic theory, as well as incapacitation effects that arise when offenders are incarcerated
and thus constrained in their ability to offend.
15 Papers in this literature employ a wide variety of
econometric approaches. Early empirical papers such as
Ehrlich (1973) and Wilson and Boland (1978) focused on
the cross-sectional association between police and crime.
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 iscussion in the literature was whether police
d
reduce crime at all. Beginning with Levitt
(1997), an emerging quasi-experimental literature has argued that simultaneity bias is the
culprit for the small elasticities in the paneldata literature.16 The specific concern articulated is that if police are hired in anticipation
of an upswing in crime, then there will be a
positive bias associated with regression-based
strategies, masking a true negative elasticity.
The recent literature has therefore generally
focused instead on instrumental variables (IV)
strategies designed to overcome this bias.
The first plausible instrumental variable to study the effect of police manpower
on crime was proposed by Levitt (1997).
Leveraging data on the timing of mayoral
and gubernatorial elections, Levitt provides
evidence that in the year prior to a municipal or state election, police manpower tends
to increase, presumably due to the desire
of elected officials to appear to be “tough
on crime.” The exclusion restriction is that,
but for increases in police manpower, crime
does not vary cyclically with respect to the
election cycle. Using data from fifty-seven
cities spanning 1972–97, Levitt reports very
small least-squares estimates of the effect
of police and crime that are consistent with
the prior literature. However, IV estimates
are large and economically important, with
elasticities ranging from moderate in magnitude for property crimes (−0.55 for burglary
and −0.44 for motor vehicle theft) to large in
magnitude for violent crimes such as robbery
(−1.3) and murder (−3). Ultimately, following a reanalysis of the data by McCrary (2002),
the IV coefficients reported by Levitt were
found to be insignificant after a problem with
weighting was addressed. The insignificance
of the coefficients is u
 ltimately driven by the
16 Some of the leading examples of quasi-experimental
papers are Levitt (2002), Di Tella and Schargrodsky (2004),
Klick and Tabarrok (2005), Evans and Owens (2007), Lin
(2009), and Machin and Marie (2011).

fact that the first-stage relationship between
election cycles and police hiring is weak,

complicating both estimation and inference.
Levitt (1997) has given rise to a series of
related papers that seek to identify a national
effect of police manpower on crime by isolating conditionally exogenous within-city variation in police staffing levels. These papers
include Levitt (2002), which uses variation
in firefighter numbers as an instrument for
police manpower; Evans and Owens (2007),
who instrument for police manpower using
the size of federal Community Oriented
Policing Services (COPS) grants awarded
to cities to promote police hiring; and Lin
(2009), who instruments for changes in police
manpower using the idea that US states
have differential exposure to exchange-rate
shocks depending on the export intensity
of local industry. These strategies consistently
demonstrate that police do reduce crime.17
However, the estimated elasticities display a
wide range, roughly −0.1 to −2, depending
on the study and the type of crime. Moreover,
relatively few of the estimated elasticities are
significant at conventional levels of confidence,
reflecting a great deal of sampling variability
and the use of relatively weak instruments. In
many cases, extremely large elasticities (i.e.,
those larger than one in magnitude) cannot
be differentiated from zero. Overall, Chalfin
and McCrary (forthcoming) characterize
the pattern of the cross-crime elasticities as,
in general, favoring a larger effect of police
on violent crimes than on property crimes,
with especially large effects of police on
murder, robbery, and motor vehicle theft.18
17 Notably, Worrall and Kovandzic (2007) report no
reduced-form relationship between COPS grants and
crime. However, their analysis is based on a smaller sample
of cities than the analysis of Evans and Owens (2007).
18 This pattern is found in several prominent panel
data papers, in particular Levitt (1997), Evans and Owens
(2007), and Chalfin and McCrary (forthcoming), each of
which report especially large elasticity estimates for murder (−0.6 to −0.8) and robbery (−0.5 to −1.4).
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A second noteworthy contribution to the
modern police manpower literature is that of
Marvell and Moody (1996), who leverage the
concept of Granger causality to explore the
extent to which police manpower is, in fact,
responsive to changes in crime. The motivation behind such an approach is that if crime
is responsive to lagged police but police staffing is not responsive to lagged crime, then
the case for instrumental variables is weakened considerably. Finding no evidence of
a link between lagged crime rates and current police staffing levels at either the state
or city level, Marvell and Moody estimate
the responsiveness of crime to police using
a standard two-way fixed-effects model and
report elasticities that are fairly small in magnitude (ranging from −0.15 for burglary to
−0.30 for motor vehicle theft) and are more
consistent with the early least-squares literature than the IV literature that has proliferated in recent years.
Ultimately, the Granger causality exercise is subject to the same omitted variables
bias concerns that plague any least squares
regression model, and is therefore of dubious
value in establishing causality. Nevertheless,
the weak evidence of a link between lagged
crime and current police staffing presented
in Marvell and Moody is, in our view, underappreciated. Given the large discrepancy
between Marvell and Moody’s estimates and
those in Levitt (1997), which use the same
underlying data, one of two propositions
must be true: (1) Marvell and Moody’s estimates of the effect of lagged crime on police
manpower are biased due to the exclusion of
important omitted variables, or (2) There is no
simultaneity bias between police and crime—
discrepancies between least squares and IV
estimates are instead driven by measurement
errors in either police staffing or measures of
UCR index crimes. This is an idea that is dealt
with in detail in Chalfin and McCrary (forthcoming). Leveraging two potentially independent measures of police manpower (one
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from the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reports and
another from the US Census’s Annual Survey
of Government Employment) for a sample of
242 US cities over a fifty-one-year time period,
Chalfin and McCrary construct measurement
error corrected IV models using one measure
of police as an instrument for the other. Their
principal finding is that elasticities reported in
the recent IV literature can be replicated by
simply correcting for measurement errors in
police data and without explicitly addressing
the possibility of simultaneity bias. The resulting implication is that Marvell and Moody’s
basic inference regarding the lack of causality
running from crime to police manpower may
be correct. A related contribution in Chalfin
and McCrary is to estimate police elasticities
with remarkable precision, reporting elasticities of −0.67 ± 0.48for murder, −0.56 ± 0.24
for robbery, −
 0.34 ± 0.20for motor vehicle
theft, and −0.23 ± 0.18for burglary.
While the majority of the police manpower
literature uses aggregate data, there is a corresponding literature that assesses the impact
of police on crime using natural experiments
in a particular jurisdiction. An early account
of such a natural experiment is found in
Andenaes (1974), who documents a large
increase in crime in Nazi-occupied Denmark
after German soldiers dissolved the entire
Danish police force (Durlauf and Nagin
2011 and Nagin 2013). Modern literature
has found similarly large effects. In particular, DeAngelo and Hansen (2014) document
an increase in traffic fatalities that occurred
in the aftermath of a budget cut in Oregon
that resulted in a mass layoff of state troopers. Similarly, Shi (2009) reports an increase
in crime in Cincinnati, OH, in the aftermath
of an incident in which police used deadly
force against an unarmed African American
teenager.19
19 As Shi (2009) notes, the police response to the riot was
to reduce productivity disproportionately in riot-affected
neighborhoods.
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3.2 Police Deployment and Tactics
The police manpower literature is informative with respect to the aggregate response of
crime to increases in police staffing. However,
the aggregate manpower literature leaves
many interesting and important questions
unanswered. In particular, to what extent do
the estimated elasticities reflect deterrence?
Likewise, what is the specific mechanism
that leads to deterrence? If the mechanism
is based on perceptual deterrence—the idea
that offenders observe an increase in police
presence and adjust their behavior accordingly—then it should be the case that offending is especially sensitive to large and easily
observed changes in police deployment and
tactics. To address these questions, a related
literature that is found mostly in criminology has studied the effect of changes in the
intensity of policing on crime with a distinct
focus on the crime-reducing effect of various “best practices.” In particular, declines in
crime that are not attributable to spatial displacement have been linked to the adoption
of “hot spots” policing (Sherman and Rogan
1995, Sherman and Weisburd 1995, Braga
2001, Braga 2005, Weisburd 2005, Braga
and Bond 2008, and Berk and MacDonald
2010), “problem-oriented” policing (Braga
et al. 1999; Braga et al. 2001; and Weisburd
et al. 2010), and a variety of other proactive
approaches. Similarly, a large research literature that has examined the local impact
of police crackdowns has consistently found
large and immediate (but typically not lasting) reductions in crime in the aftermath of
hyper-intensive policing (Sherman 1990).
Such findings are further supported by
evidence from several informative natural
experiments that have identified plausibly
exogenous variation in the intensity of policing. Three prominent examples are Klick
and Tabarrok (2005), who study the effect
of police redeployments in Washington, DC,
that result from shifts in terror alert levels;

Di Tella and Schargrodsky (2004), who study
the effect of a shift in the intensity of policing
in certain areas of Buenos Aires after a 1994
synagogue bombing; and Draca, Machin,
and Witt (2011), who study police redeployments in the aftermath of the 2005 London
tube bombings.
The literature on police deployments and
tactics has focused predominantly on three
types of interventions. The first is an innovation commonly referred to as “hot-spots”
policing. As the moniker suggests, hotspots policing describes a strategy in which
police are disproportionately deployed to
areas in a city that appear to attract disproportionate levels of crime.20 The second
type of intervention is often referred to as
“
problem-oriented” policing. This term
is used broadly and refers to a collection
of focused deterrence strategies that are
designed to change the behavior of specific
types of offenders or to be successful in specific jurisdictions. A final intervention that
has received attention in the literature is that
of “proactive” policing. Proactive policing
refers to strategies that are deigned to make
policing more intensive, holding resources
fixed. The idea can be traced back to the
concept of “broken windows,” or disorder
policing introduced by Wilson and Kelling
(1982) and refers to the notion that, just like
fixing a broken window sends a message to
would-be vandals that the community cares
about maintaining social order, arresting
individuals for relatively minor infractions
sends a message to potential offenders that
the police are watchful.

20 The idea that crime hot spots might exist is immediately obvious to many and can be found in the academic
literature at least as far back as Shaw and McKay (1942).
Modern research has linked criminal activity to specific
types of places such as bars (Roman and Reid 2012) and
apartment buildings, as well as to places that lack formal or
informal guardians (Eck and Weisburd 1995).
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3.2.1 Hot-Spots Policing
We begin with a discussion of hot-spots
policing, which we distinguish from aggregate police manpower research for several
reasons. First, as the manpower literature
largely uses city-level variation, it identifies
the effect of adding police at the expense of
some other type of public input. In contrast,
hot-spots policing involves a reallocation of
existing resources. Such a strategy is advantageous, as it does not require a change in
current outlays. However, it also leaves open
the possibility that moving police around
merely shifts, rather than reduces, crime.
In order for hot-spots policing to be a
viable crime reduction strategy, two conditions must be met. First, given resource constraints, the feasibility of such a deployment
strategy relies on crime being sufficiently
concentrated in a relatively small number of
hot spots. Second, hot spots must be sufficiently stable such that the spatial distribution of crime in the absence of a change in
police deployment can be predicted with a
reasonable degree of accuracy. Hence, the
adoption of hot-spots policing must begin
with an accounting of the geographic concentration of crime, as well as an assessment
of the extent to which hot spots are permanent as opposed to transitory. Sherman
(1995) captures both of these ideas, characterizing crime hot spots as “small places in
which the occurrence of crime is so frequent
that it is highly predictable, at least over a
one-year period.”
A seminal paper by Sherman, Gartin, and
Buerger (1989) is the first to provide descriptive data on the degree to which crime is
spatially concentrated. Using data from
Minneapolis, Sherman and coauthors found
that just 3 percent of addresses and intersections in Minneapolis produced 50 percent of all calls for service to the police. This
finding is echoed by Weisburd, Maher, and
Sherman (1992) and in more recent papers by
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Weisburd et al. (2004) and Weisburd, Morris,
and Groff (2009), which report that a very
small percentage of street segments in Seattle
accounted for 50 percent of crime incidents
for each year over a fourteen-year period.21
With respect to predictability, Weisburd et al.
(2004), using the same data from Seattle, used
trajectory a nalysis to establish that hot spots
tended to be highly persistent, often persisting for many years.22
Naturally, the observation that crime is
so highly concentrated in a very small number of places has led to efforts to intensify the focus of police resources on these
places. These interventions have, in turn,
led to a corresponding experimental and
quasi-experimental research literature that
seeks to evaluate the efficacy of such strategies. The first-order question that the hotspots policing literature seeks to address
involves the degree to which highly localized crime is responsive to a change in the
intensity of policing. By responsive, criminologists generally refer to the idea that
crime declines in local areas that have been
exposed to more intensive patrol without
merely inducing equivalent spillovers to
untreated adjacent areas. However, we note
that while spillovers undermine the viability
of hot-spots policing as a crime-reduction
strategy, they nevertheless constitute evidence of responsiveness and, as such, are
useful in identifying deterrence. Moreover,
a particular feature of this research makes it
especially salient for the study of deterrence
(Nagin 2013). Notably, while the literature
tends to find that intensive policing reduces
crime, elements of intensive policing such
as rapid response times do not appear to
increase the likelihood of an arrest (Spelman
21 An excellent review of this literature may be found in
Weisburd, Bruinsma, and Bernasco (2009).
22 Hot spots can, of course, also be temporary. An excellent accounting of efforts to predict temporary hot spots in
Pittsburgh can be found in Gorr and Lee (2015).
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and Brown 1981). Such a pattern in the data
tends to be consistent with deterrence but
not with incapacitation.
The first test of policing crime hot spots
may be found in a 1995 randomized experiment conducted by Sherman and Weisburd
in Minneapolis. The experiment tested
whether doubling the intensity of police
patrols in crime hot spots resulted in a
decrease in crime and found that crime
declined by approximately 10 percent in
experimental places relative to control places.
No evidence of crime displacement—that is,
spillovers—was found. Findings in Sherman
and Weisburd (1995) have, to a large extent,
been replicated in other places and contexts
including the presence of open-air drug
markets and “crack houses” (Hope 1994,
Weisburd and Green 1995, and Sherman et
al. 1995), violent crime hot spots (Sherman
and Rogan 1995, Braga et al. 1999, and Caeti
1999), and places associated with substantial social disorder (Braga and Bond 2008
and Berk and MacDonald 2010). Indeed, a
review of the literature by Braga (2001) identified nine experiments or q
 uasi-experiments
involving hot-spots policing and noted that
seven of the nine studies, including a majority
of the randomized experiments, found evidence of significant and large crime reductions. Notably, a majority of the literature
finds no evidence of displacement of crime
to adjacent neighborhoods (Weisburd et al.
2006), while a number of studies have found
that the opposite is true—that there tends
to be a diffusion of benefits to nontreated
adjacent places (Sherman and Rogan 1995,
Braga et al. 1999, and Caeti 1999).23 Both of
these findings are perfectly consistent with
our conceptualization of deterrence.

23 An excellent review of the theory and empirical findings regarding displacement in this literature can be found
in Weisburd et al. (2006).

3.2.2 Problem-Oriented Policing
Intensive policing of hot spots is one way
that police potentially deter crime. Another
broad deterrence-based strategy is that of
problem-oriented policing. Broadly speaking, this strategy entails engaging with
community residents to identify the most
salient local crime problems and designing
strategies to deter unwanted behavior. The
specifics are highly variable by design and
are intended to leverage local resources
to address highly local concerns. What
these strategies have in common and why
they are frequently referred to as “focused
deterrence” strategies is that each of them
attempts to generate deterrence through
advertising (Zimring and Hawkins 1973).
The idea is to create deterrence by making
potential offenders explicitly aware of the
risks of serious criminal involvement.
Undoubtedly the most well-known evaluation of a problem-oriented policing approach
is that of Boston’s Operation Ceasefire by
Kennedy et al. (2001). The stated purpose
of Ceasefire was to reduce youth gun violence in Boston. The intervention involved a
multifaceted approach and included efforts
to disrupt the supply of illegal weapons to
Massachusetts. It also included messages
communicated by police directly to gang
members that authorities would use every
available “lever” to punish gangs collectively
for violent acts committed by individual gang
members. In particular, police indicated that
the stringency of drug enforcement would
hinge on the degree to which gangs used violence to settle business disputes. The result of
the intervention was that youth violence fell
considerably in Boston relative to other US
cities included in the study.
Indeed, the perception of Ceasefire
has been overwhelmingly positive and
accordingly it has given rise to a number
of similarly motivated strategies that are
collectively referred to as “pulling levers.”
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Prominent evaluations of pulling-levers
interventions include research carried out
in Richmond, VA (Raphael and Ludwig
2003), Indianapolis (McGarrell et al. 2006),
Chicago (Papachristos, Meares, and Fagan
2007), Stockton, CA (Braga 2008b), Lowell,
MA (Braga et al. 2008), High Point, NC
(Corsaro et al. 2012), Nashville (Corsaro
and McGarrell 2010), Cincinnati (Engel,
Corsaro, and Tillyer 2010), and Rockford,
IL (Corsaro, Brunson, and McGarrell 2010).
Researchers have also evaluated a multicity pulling-levers strategy known as Project
Safe Neighborhoods (PSN), which enlisted
the cooperation of federal prosecutors to
crack down on gun violence. A 2012 review
of the literature by Braga and Weisburd
suggests that pulling-levers strategies have
been effective in reducing serious violent
crime, with all reviewed studies finding negative point estimates, the majority of which
were significant. With respect to individual
evaluations, reductions in crime have been
found in High Point, Chicago, Indianapolis,
Stockton, Lowell, Nashville, and Rockford
and null findings have been found in
Richmond and Cincinnati.24 With respect to
Project Safe Neighborhoods, the research is
promising but not definitive. McGarrell et
al. (2010) report that declines in crime were
greater in PSN cities than in non-PSN cities.
However, there is a great deal of heterogeneity among cities, making it difficult to draw
clear inferences.
On the whole, evaluations of pullinglevers strategies produce promising results,
though inference is invariably complicated
by a lack of randomized experiments and
the inherent difficulty in identifying appropriate comparison cities. Identification
problems are additionally compounded by
the difficulty in identifying mechanisms, as
24 Braga and Weisburd (2012) provided an excellent review of the literature including a comprehensive
meta-analysis of the research findings.
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each pulling-levers strategy is complex, multifaceted, and situation dependent, often
involving changes in both the intensity of
law enforcement as well as sentencing (e.g.,
Project Exile in Richmond, VA, as well as
Project Safe Neighborhoods). Accordingly,
it is easy to imagine that as additional
resources are brought to bear, some of the
effects of pulling-levers strategies might
accrue via incapacitation effects. Concerns
regarding identification have led Skogan and
Frydl (2004) to conclude that such research
is “descriptive rather than evaluative.” Given
the relatively large effect sizes reported in
the literature, our reading of these papers
is more optimistic than that of Skogan and
Frydl. However, caution is warranted in characterizing this literature as having detected
unassailable evidence of deterrence.
3.2.3 Proactive and Disorder Policing
A final strand of the police tactics literature in criminology investigates the responsiveness of crime to the intensity of policing,
holding resources constant, an idea that is
generally referred to as “proactive” policing.
As there is no standardized way to assess the
extent to which individual police departments
engage in police work that is proactive, in
practice, this literature seeks to understand
if the intensity of arrests for minor infractions has an effect on the incidence of more
serious crimes. Building on a proposition in
Wilson and Kelling (1982), such an empirical operationalization was first proposed by
Sampson and Cohen (1988) and has been
replicated to various degrees by MacDonald
(2002) and Kubrin et al. (2010). The general
strategy is to regress crime rates on a measure of policing intensity. In practice, policing intensity has been operationalized using
the number of driving under the influence
(DUI) and disorderly conduct arrests made
per police officer. Using this approach has,
in some cases, led to findings that are consistent with a deterrence effect of proactive
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olicing. However, in the best controlled
p
models, coefficients on the proactive policing
proxy become small and insignificant. More
importantly, these models are plagued by
problems of simultaneity bias, omitted variables, and the inevitable difficulty involved
in finding a credible proxy for the concept of
proactive policing, as opposed to simply an
environment that is rich in opportunities for
police officers to make arrests.
A second focus of the literature has been
on the advent of broken-windows policing
(also known as “order maintenance” or “disorder” policing, a policy innovation proposed
by Wilson and Kelling 1982). The idea behind
broken-windows policing is that police can
affect crime through tough enforcement of
laws governing relatively minor infractions
such as vandalism and turnstile jumping.
Broken-windows policing, in theory, operates
primarily through perceptual deterrence—if
offenders observe that police are especially
watchful, they may update their perceived
probability of apprehension for a more serious
crime and accordingly will decrease their participation in crime. In the popular media, broken-windows policing is an idea that is heavily
associated with Mayor Rudolph Giuliani and
New York Police Commissioner William J.
Bratton, who has attributed the dramatic
decline in crime in New York City after 1990
to its rollout (Kelling and Bratton 2015).
A corresponding research literature
has arisen to evaluate the effectiveness of
broken-windows policing—in practice, this
literature has focused disproportionately
on the experience of New York City, which
experienced the largest decline in crime
among major US cities. This literature produces mixed findings. On the one hand, time
series analyses by Kelling and Sousa (2001)
and Corman and Mocan (2005) find that
misdemeanor arrests are negatively associated with future arrests for more serious
crimes such as robbery and motor vehicle
theft. On the other hand, later research has

pointed out that these studies omit a control group and has tended to focus on the
fact that New York’s aggregate crime trends,
while steeper, are broadly similar to those of
other cities that did not institute a policy of
broken-windows policing (Eck and Maguire
2000; Rosenfeld, Fornango, and Baumer
2005; and Harcourt and Ludwig 2006).
The two most credible analyses, those of
Harcourt and Ludwig (2006) and Rosenfeld,
Fornango, and Rengifo (2007), use
precinct-level data on misdemeanor arrests
and violations and find either no effect or
very small effects. More fundamentally, there
are a number of alternative explanations for
New York’s dramatic reduction in crime
including the receding of the crack epidemic
(Blumstein 1995), changes in demographics
that are poorly measured at lower levels of
geographic granularity, general strategies
to address disorder such as boarding abandoned buildings, and the implementation of
the data-driven Compstat system (Weisburd
et al. 2003). Accordingly, even if identification problems can be set aside, it is unclear
that this literature can isolate the impact of
disorder policing from other changes that
drove crime down in New York City. Given
the dramatic rollback of the New York City
Police Department’s “stop-and-frisk” policy
in 2014 and the continued decline in serious
crime, as well as the failure of the most careful studies to find evidence of large effects,
we are skeptical that disorder policing has
played a large role in the decline in crime
in New York City.25 Overall, our reading of
this literature is that the e vidence in favor of
an important effect of proactive policing on
crime is weak.

25 Broken-windows policing and the associated stopand-frisk policy implemented by the New York City police
department has generated substantial public controversy.
A 2009 paper by Fagan et al. (2009) provides evidence of
the demographic burden of such policies that is disproportionately borne by African Americans.
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Of course, New York City is not the only
municipality to experiment with disorder
policing and, in our view, some of the strongest evidence can be found in research
from other cities. Three papers that employ
especially strong research designs are worth
mentioning. Braga et al. (1999) provides the
first experimental evaluation of a strategy
designed explicitly to address disorder. In
Jersey City, NJ, twelve of twenty-four crime
hot spots were randomly assigned to receive
an intervention that involved disorder policing as well as other place-specific treatments that were intended to reduce crime.
Such treatments include clearing vacant
lots, requiring store owners to clean store
fronts, and facilitating more frequent trash
removal. Treated places experienced large
declines in both crime and calls for service.
In a follow-up study in Lowell, MA, Braga
and Bond (2008) attempted to further isolate
disorder policing from other types of disorder reduction, randomly assigning seventeen
Lowell hot spots to receive a general disorder policing strategy. This study also showed
strong reductions in crime in treated areas.
However, the greatest gains were found in
areas with an especially heavy focus on situational crime prevention, as opposed to
arresting larger numbers of low-level offenders. Evidence in favor of an effect of misdemeanor arrests is far more limited. Finally,
a particularly careful paper by Caetano and
Maheshri (2014) finds no evidence of an
effect of “zero tolerance” law enforcement
policies on crime using microdata from
police precincts in Dallas. Taken as a whole,
the evidence suggests that reducing disorder
is a promising strategy for controlling crime.
However, it is difficult to characterize these
reductions as deterrence. In particular, disorder reduction may simply help people to feel
better about their neighborhoods, thus representing a shift in preferences, rather than
movement along the curve that is induced
by an increase in the perceived probability

21

of capture by police. We remain skeptical
that disorder policing provides evidence of
deterrence.
3.2.4 Changes in City-Wide Police
Deployments
The ubiquity of the hot spots, problemoriented and proactive policing literatures
in criminology has spawned a parallel literature in economics that seeks to learn from
natural experiments in police deployments.
This literature is conceptually similar to the
hot-spots literature with two exceptions.
First, the identifying variation is naturally
occurring in contrast to experimental manipulation, which may be excessively contrived.
Second, several of the natural experiments
identify the impact of a diffuse reduction
in resources, rather than a concentration of
resources at particular hot spots.
Three prominent studies are those of
Di Tella and Schargrodsky (2004); Klick and
Tabarrok (2005); and Draca, Machin, and
Witt (2011). Each of these studies leverages a redeployment of police in response
to a perceived terrorist threat. The appeal
of these studies is that terrorist threats are
plausibly exogenous with respect to trends
in city-level crime and therefore represent
a unique opportunity to learn about the
response of crime to changes in normal routines of policing. Di Tella and Schargrodsky
study the response of police in Buenos Aires
to the 1994 bombing of a Jewish community
center. In the aftermath of the 
bombing,
Argentine police engaged in a strategy of
“target hardening” synagogues by deploying disproportionate numbers of officers to
blocks with synagogues or other buildings
housing Jewish organizations. Di Tella and
Schargordsky report that the intervention
led to a large decline in motor vehicle thefts
on the blocks that received additional police
patrols though the effects. Notably, this result
has been called into question by Donohue,
Ho, and Leahy (2013), who reanalyzed
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the original data and report evidence that
is more consistent with spatial displacement of crime rather than crime reduction.
However, with respect to identifying behavioral changes among offenders, both stories
are equally consistent with deterrence. In
a similar study, Klick and Tabarrok (2005)
utilize the fact that when terror alert levels
set by the US Department of Homeland
Security rise, property crime (but not violent
crime) tends to fall in Washington DC, with
especially large declines in areas that receive
the largest redeployments of police protection. With respect to the United Kingdom,
Draca, Machin, and Witt (2011) study the
2005 London tube bombings which resulted
in sizable shifts in the deployments of police
from the suburbs to central London and
find that “street crimes” such as robbery and
theft are reduced considerably in areas that
received additional officers.
With respect to studying variation in the
spatial concentration of police, two additional
papers are worth noting. Cohen and Ludwig
(2003) exploit short-term variation in the
intensity of police patrols by day of the week
in several different Pittsburgh patrol areas.
They found that shootings were considerably lower in areas and on days that received
more intensive police patrols. With respect
to the long-term consequences of patterns of
police deployments, MacDonald, Klick, and
Grunwald (2016) use a spatial regression discontinuity (RD) design to study the impact
of especially intensive policing around the
University of Pennsylvania, a large urban university campus. In particular, areas directly
adjacent to the university received police
patrols from both the university and municipal police. Areas slightly further away from
the campus received only municipal police
patrols. The finding is that street crimes are
substantially higher in the blocks just outside
the area patrolled by the university police
relative to the blocks just inside the university patrol area.

3.3 Deterrence versus Incapacitation
The literature has reached a consensus
that increases in police manpower reduce
crime, at least for a population-weighted
average of US cities. With respect to police
deployments and tactics, the literature supports the idea that crime is responsive to a
visible police presence in hot spots and pulling-levers strategies that advertise deterrence, while evidence in favor of an effect
of proactive policing strategies such as broken windows and disorder policing is more
suspect. A remaining issue is to address the
degree to which each of these literatures is
informative with respect to disentangling
deterrence from incapacitation.
With respect to the aggregate manpower
literature, Levitt (1998) provides the first
attempt to systematically unpack the relationship between deterrence and incapacitation by empirically examining the link
between arrest rates and crime, a relationship that is negative. Levitt posits that
this negative relationship can be explained
either by deterrence, incapacitation, or
measurement errors in crime. Ruling out
measurement errors as a likely culprit, he
differentiates between deterrence and
incapacitation using the effect of changes
in the arrest rate for one crime on the rate
of other crimes.26 As Levitt notes, “in contrast to the effect of increased arrests for
one crime on the commission of that crime,
where d
eterrence and incapacitation are
indistinguishable, it is demonstrated that
these two forces act in opposite directions
when looking across crimes. Incapacitation
suggests that an increase in the arrest rate
for one crime will reduce all crime rates;
26 Utilizing an insight from Grilliches and Hausman
(1986)—that measurement errors should yield the g reatest
bias in short-differenced regressions—Levitt (1998) compares regression estimates of the relationship between
crime and arrest rates using short- and long-differences,
finding similar effects.
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deterrence predicts that an increase in the
arrest rate for one crime will lead to a rise
in other crimes as criminals substitute away
from the first crime.” Levitt concludes that
deterrence appears to be the more important factor, particularly for property crimes.
Owens (2013) reports a similar finding,
examining whether variation in police staffing resulting from the COPS hiring program led to increased arrests. Despite the
fact that the program, which provided funding to increase the number of patrol officers
in US cities, appears to have led to a decline
in crime, no significant effect is found on
arrests. As a result, Owens concludes that
there is little evidence in favor of incapacitation, which necessarily must operate
through arrests, thus implying a large role
for deterrence.
While analyses by Levitt (1998) and
Owens (2013) are suggestive of a meaningful role for manpower-induced deterrence,
it is nevertheless difficult to disentangle
deterrence from incapacitation in this way.
In particular, a null relationship between
police and arrests is also consistent with
the idea that police productivity decreases
when there are fewer crimes to investigate. Moreover, the imprecise parameter
estimates on arrest along with standard
errors that are not trivial in size in Owens
(2013) render it difficult to make strong
claims regarding the null effect of police
on arrests. For this reason, while the aggregate-data literature is ideal for understanding the overall relationship between police
and crime, it is only somewhat informative
with respect to the magnitude of deterrence. This point is further compounded
by the observation that research has yet to
document the degree to which offenders
perceive or are aware of increases in police
manpower (Nagin 1998).
We suspect that the literature on police
tactics is considerably more informative
with respect to identifying deterrence. In
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 articular, offenders are more likely to be
p
aware of an enhanced police presence in
small, local areas than relatively small changes
in the number of police in a city spread out
over a large geographic area. Likewise, while
offenders tend to commit crimes locally, in
order for incapacitation to explain the large
declines in crime that occur in hot spots, it
would have to be the case that offending
is so local so as to be specific to a group of
one or two blocks. The large drops in crime
that occur in crime hot spots after they are
more aggressively policed is more consistent
with deterrence than with incapacitation.
Focused deterrence strategies are also particularly informative in that declines in crime
have been shown to be specific to the focus
of the intervention. To the extent that at least
some offenders are generalists, rather than
specialists who commit only a certain type
of offense, such a pattern is more consistent
with deterrence than with incapacitation.
In sum, while it remains possible that an
increased police presence lowers crime by
situating police officers in locations where
they are more likely to arrest and incapacitate potential offenders, on the whole, the
high degree of visibility around police crackdowns or hot spots policing suggests a potentially greater role for deterrence.27
4.

Sanctions and Crime

A second idea in Becker’s neoclassical
model of offending is that crime will be
responsive to the certainty and severity

27 An important exception to this intuition, however,
can be found in Mastrobuoni (2013), who studies the
responsiveness of crime to regular shift changes among
the various police forces in Milan. Matsrobuoni finds that
despite large temporal discontinuities in clearance rates
during shift changes, robbers do not appear to exploit these
opportunities and concludes that there is only limited evidence of deterrence. A remaining question is the extent to
which the result depends on the ability of potential offenders to accurately perceive these discontinuities.
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of punishment.28 Accordingly, a parallel
literature considers the responsiveness of

crime to the harshness of criminal sanctions,
along both the intensive and extensive margin. Three literatures, in particular, are worth
mentioning. First, a series of papers considers the effect of sentencing policy generally
or, alternatively, sentence enhancements on
crime, to test the prediction that crime will
decrease in response to a sanction regime
that either raises the probability of a prison
sentence or raises the length of a prison sentence, if given. In practice, this literature
focuses primarily on the intensive margin,
that is, the severity of punishment rather than
the probability that a custodial punishment
is given conditional upon being arrested. A
corresponding literature considers the effect
of laws that govern the age of criminal majority and, as such, generate large and pervasive
discontinuities in the sanctions that individual offenders face. Since adult sanctions are
more intensive along both the intensive and
extensive margins, such studies identify a
reduced-form deterrence effect that does not
explicitly differentiate between the certainty
and the severity of punishment. Finally, a
particularly prominent literature considers
the effect of a capital-punishment regime or
the incidence of executions on murder. Since
executions enhance the expected severity of
the sanction without directly affecting an
offender’s probability of capture, this literature is potentially compelling with respect
to understanding deterrence as, subject to
satisfying the standards of econometric identification, it allows for the isolation of a pure

28 The term “certainty of punishment” is often used in
the literature to refer either to the probability that an individual is apprehended or to the overall probability that an
individual is punished conditional upon offending. In this
section, in referring to the certainty of punishment, we are
focusing more specifically on the probability that a punishment is handed out conditional upon arrest. This refers
to the severity of punishment along the extensive margin.

deterrence effect operationalized along the
intensive margin.
4.1 Sentencing
One of the most basic tests of the Becker
model of crime concerns the responsiveness of crime to the harshness of criminal
sanctions. Over the past few decades, a literature has arisen to document the sensitivity of crime to various sentencing schemes,
sentence enhancements, clemency policies,
“three strikes” laws, and other legislative
actions that change the expected cost of a
criminal sanction. A corresponding literature
measures the responsiveness of crime to the
size of the prison population. With respect
to identification, two challenges are particularly pressing. First, it is difficult to discern
the effect of sentencing policies (which, in
the United States, are generally enacted at
the state level) from other crime reduction
interventions, as well as time-varying factors
that inform the supply of crime more generally. Attempts to isolate the causal effects
of a change in state-level sentencing policy
invariably encounter the inevitably difficult
issues of choosing an appropriate comparison group and selecting from among many
competing and equally plausible models of
aggregate offending. Durlauf and Nagin
(2011) refer to the latter of these issues as
the problem of ad hoc model specification,
referring specifically to the under-theorized
manner in which individual-level mental
processes are modeled and the arbitrary
choice of control variables in regressions.
Second, just as prison populations may
affect crime, crime may have a reciprocal
effect on prison populations, creating the
potential for simultaneity bias.29 With respect
to identifying deterrence, the chief difficulty
is that harsher sanctions may lead to deterrence, but typically also to incapacitation.
29 For a comprehensive review of identification issues in
this literature, see Durlauf and Nagin (2011).
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This section reviews the literature that seeks
to understand the relationship between sanctions and offending with a particular interest
in discerning the effect that sanctions have
on deterrence.
4.1.1 Prison Populations and Crime
While identifying the elasticity of crime
with respect to a sanction, in principle,
requires an exogenous shock to the sanctions
regime, a natural starting point in unraveling
the crime–sanctions relationship is to consider the elasticity of crime with respect to
the size of the prison population. Studies of
the crime–prison population elasticity generally utilize state-level panel data and regress
the growth rate in crime on the first lag of
the growth rate in a state’s share of prisoners.
Marvell and Moody (1994) provide the first
credible empirical investigation of the elasticity of crime with respect to prison populations, estimating an elasticity of −0.16. As
in their police paper, they use the concept of
Granger causality in an attempt to rule out a
causal relationship that runs from crime to
prison populations. As discussed in section 2,
the approach, while useful, does not offer
compelling reasons to believe in the ignorability of selection bias.
A genuine breakthrough in this literature
is found in Levitt (1996) who, using similar
data, exploits exogenous variation in state
incarceration rates induced by court orders
to reduce prison populations. The intuition
behind the approach is that the timing of
discrete reductions in a state’s prison population owing to a court order should be as good
as random. This may not be strictly true, as
the necessity of court orders to reduce overcrowding may itself be a function of rising
crime rates. However, the strategy relies more
specifically on the randomness of the precise
timing of the order and, in our judgment,
represents a plausible strategy for identifying a causal estimate of the effect of prison
populations on crime. Levitt’s 
estimated
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e lasticities are considerably larger than those
in Marvell and Moody: −0.4 for violent
crimes and −0.3 for property crimes, while
the largest elasticity reported is for robbery
(−0.7).30 An alternative identification strategy can be found in Johnson and Raphael
(2012), who develop an instrumental variable to predict future changes in incarceration rates. The instrument is constructed by
computing a theoretically predicted dynamic
adjustment path of the aggregate incarceration rate in response to a given shock to
prison entrance and exit transition probabilities. Given that incarceration rates adjust
to permanent changes in behavior with a
dynamic lag, the authors identify variation in
incarceration that is not due to contemporaneous criminal offending. Using state-level
panel data covering 1978–2004, Johnson
and Raphael (2012) estimate the elasticity
of crime with respect to prison populations
of approximately −0.1 for violent crimes and
−0.2 for property crimes. Notably, the estimated elasticities in Johnson and Raphael for
earlier time periods were considerably larger
and closer in magnitude to those estimated
by Levitt (1996). Johnson and Raphael conclude that the criminal productivity of the
marginal offender has changed considerably
over time as incarceration rates have risen, a
conclusion that is echoed by Liedka, Piehl,
and Useem (2006). With respect to juveniles,
Levitt (1998) studies the response of juvenile
crime to the punitiveness of state-level juvenile sentencing along the extensive margin
(the number of juveniles in custody per
capita), concluding that changes in juvenile
sentencing explain approximately 60 percent of the growth in juvenile crime during
the 1970s and 1980s. Using Levitt’s results,
Lee and McCrary (forthcoming) compute an
implied elasticity for violent crimes of −0.4.
30 Levitt’s analysis is replicated by Spelman (2000) who
reports qualitatively similar findings.
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In sum, estimates of the elasticity of crime
with respect to prison are generally modest
in comparison to police elasticities and fall
between −0.1 and −0.7. The most recent
estimates fall in the low end of that range.
Estimates for violent and property crimes are
of approximately equal magnitude and there
is evidence that the elasticity has diminished
considerably over time as prison populations
have grown. Our best guess is that the current
elasticity of crime with respect to prison populations is approximately −0.2, as reported
by Johnson and Raphael (2012).31 This finding is further bolstered by a recent evaluation of “realignment,” a policy implemented
in California to reduce prison overcrowding
by sending additional inmates to county jails,
where they tend to serve shorter sentences.
Lofstrom and Raphael (2013) report that,
with the exception of motor vehicle theft,
there is no evidence of an increase in crime
despite the fact that 18,000 offenders who
would have been incarcerated are on the
street due to the realignment policy. The
magnitude of this elasticity leaves open the
possibility for nontrivial deterrence effects
of prison but, given that prison generates
sizable incapacitation effects, the magnitude
of deterrence is likely small.
4.1.2 Shocks to the Sanctions Regime
A related literature considers the effect of
a discrete change in a jurisdiction’s s anctions
regime that is plausibly not a function of
crime trends more generally. The general
approach is to utilize a differences-in-differences design to compare the time-path of
crimes covered by a sentence enhancement
to that of uncovered crimes. The earliest literature (Loftin and McDowall 1981; Loftin,
Heumann, and McDowall 1983; Loftin and
McDowall 1984; and McDowall, Loftin,
31 A

2009 review of the literature by Donohue reaches
a similar conclusion.

and Wiersma 1992) considered the effects
of sentence enhancements for specific
crimes—particularly gun crimes—generally
finding little evidence in favor of deterrence.
A more recent paper studies the impact of
changes in sentencing in the aftermath of
London’s 2011 riots. Leveraging the fact that
judges in the United Kingdom handed down
harsher sentences for “riot offenses” in the
six months following the riots, Bell, Jaitman,
and Machin (2014) find evidence of sizable
declines in riot offenses relative to nonriot
offenses which, in the absence of identifiable
changes in policing, they attribute to the
advent of a harsher sanctions regime. This
claim is bolstered by the fact that there was
a relative decline in riot offenses in sectors
that experienced the brunt of the 2011 riots,
as well as sectors that saw no riot activity.32
A second class of studies has examined the
impact of changes in the sanctions regime
that have heterogeneous impacts on different groups of offenders. For example, Drago,
Galbiati, and Vertova (2009) study the effect
of a 2006 collective clemency of incarcerated prisoners in Italy. Prisoners incarcerated prior to May 2006 were released from
prison with the remainder of their sentences
suspended, while prisoners incarcerated
after May 2006 were ineligible for the clemency. Released prisoners, however, were
subject to a sentence enhancement for any
future crimes committed that were serious
enough to merit a sentence of at least two
years. For such crimes, the sentence would
be augmented by adding the amount of time
the prisoner was sentenced to serve prior to
his pardon to his new sentence. Thus, the
intervention created a situation in which
otherwise similar individuals convicted of
the same crime faced dramatically different
sanctions regimes. The results of this n
 atural
32 Sentencing did change along both the intensive and
extensive margins, indicating the incapacitation cannot be
ruled out.
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experiment suggest an elasticity of crime
with respect to sentence length of approximately −0.5 at one year follow-up. Utilizing
the same natural experiment, Buonanno and
Raphael (2013) report evidence that incapacitation effects forgone as a result of the
collective clemency were large, thus constraining the magnitude of the deterrence
effect.
Similar findings are reported for the
United States by Helland and Tabarrok
(2007). Using data from California’s threestrikes regime, Helland and Tabarrok (2007)
compare the criminal behavior of individuals
convicted of a second “strikeable” offense to
those tried for a second strikeable offense
but who were ultimately convicted of a lesser
offense. As Durlauf and Nagin (2011) note,
individuals with one strike may not be an
ideal comparison group for a variety of reasons—in particular, it may be the case that
the individuals with two strikes had poorer
legal representation or that the precise nature
of their potential second-strike offense was
qualitatively less serious. Nevertheless, the
authors demonstrate that comparing twostrike to one-strike individuals is sufficient
to remove a great deal of the selection bias
that exists in comparing individuals with
two strikes to the remainder of the charged
population. The authors find evidence of
an appreciable deterrent effect, calculating that California’s three-strikes legislation
reduced felony arrest rates by approximately
20 percent among criminals with two strikeable offenses against them. Similarly, while
Zimring, Hawkins, and Kamin (2001) find
little evidence of an overall effect of threestrikes legislation, they do find evidence that
individual offenders with two strikes are less
likely to be arrested. Given that the deterrence margin is most salient at two strikes,
these studies stand out as especially important with respect to identifying a meaningful deterrence effect of sentencing. On the
other hand, the m
 agnitude of the response
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is actually quite small once one considers
the increase in sentence lengths associated
with three strikes. Helland and Tabarrok’s
estimates suggest an elasticity of crime with
respect to sentence length of −0.06.
Last but not least, we survey a completely
different idea with respect to changing the
sanctions regime. While sentence enhancements and three-strikes laws are designed
specifically to increase sanction severity
across either the intensive or the extensive
margin or both, it is possible to imagine
simultaneously making one margin harsher
and the other one less harsh. This is the
premise underlying swift-and-certain sanctions regimes (Hawken and Kleiman 2009
and Kleiman 2009). The idea of swift-andcertain sanctions arises from the notion that
myopic individuals are unlikely to be responsive to long sentences but may be highly
responsive to short sentences if they are
issued with near certainty. In recent practice, Hawaii’s Opportunity Probation with
Enforcement (HOPE) program is the canonical example of swift-and-certain sanctioning
in action. In an effort to address chronic
recidivism among probationers, Hawaii First
Circuit Court Judge Steven Alm recognized
that punishments for violating the terms of
probation were fairly unlikely and, if meted
out, tended to occur in the distant future.
Moreover, the sanctions were typically
harsh and, as such, costly. Judge Alm and
his collaborators put into practice a program
that addressed probation violations with
immediate but light sanctions—typically
ranging from warnings to spending up to a
week in jail. Probationers were intensively
monitored, with any violations resulting in
a sanction. In a banner finding, Hawken
and Kleiman (2009) find that individuals
assigned at random to HOPE, as opposed to
business as usual, were 55 percent less likely
to be arrested for a new crime, 72 percent
less likely to use drugs, and 53 percent less
likely to have their probation revoked than
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those on regular probation. In a similarly
promising related study, Kilmer et al. (2013)
found that a swift-and-certain program in
South Dakota targeted towards persistent
alcohol-involved offenders appears to have
had extraordinarily large effects in counties
that received the program.
4.2 Capital Punishment Regimes
Variation in the presence or intensity of
capital punishment generates a potentially
excellent source of variation with which
to test for the magnitude of general deterrence. In particular, to the extent that variation in a state’s capital-punishment regime
is unrelated to changes in the intensity of
policing, the effect of capital punishment
represents a pure measure of deterrence
with any response of murder to the presence
or intensity of capital punishment not plausibly attributable to incapacitation.33
There have been two primary approaches
to identifying deterrence effects of capital
punishment. One approach considers the
use of granular time-series data or event
studies to identify the effect of the timing of
executions on murder. Time-series studies
typically use vector autoregression to assess
whether murder rates appear to decline in
the immediate aftermath of an execution.
Prominent examples include Stolzenberg and
D’Alessio (2004), which finds no evidence
of deterrence, and Land, Teske, and Zheng
(2009), which finds evidence of short-run
deterrence. Event studies such as those of
Grogger (1991) and Hjalmarsson (2009a)
examine the daily incidence of homicides
before and after executions. Both Grogger
(1991) and Hjalmarsson (2009a) find little
evidence of deterrence effects though, as
33 The argument is that in the absence of a capital punishment regime or a death sentence, a convicted offender
would nevertheless be sentenced to a lengthy prison sentence (such as a life sentence) without the possibility of
parole.

Charles and Durlauf (2013) and Hjalmarsson
(2012) note, with a limited time horizon, it is
not possible to distinguish between what we
typically think of as deterrence and temporal displacement. A related study, Cochran,
Chamlin, and Seth (1994), considers the
effect of Oklahoma’s first execution in more
than twenty years and finds evidence that the
execution appears to have increased murder
among strangers, an effect they attribute
to a “brutalization” hypothesis, though it is
attributed with equal ease to statistical noise.
A final study worth noting is that of Zimring,
Fagan, and Johnson (2010), who compare
homicide rates between Singapore, which
uses the death penalty with variable intensity, and Hong Kong, which does not use the
death penalty. The paper finds no evidence
in favor of deterrence, as both countries
experience similar homicide trends over the
thirty-five-year time period studied.
Broadly speaking, the time-series and
event-studies literatures offer little support
in favor of deterrence though, as noted by
Charles and Durlauf (2013), the literature is
plagued by several conceptual problems that
compromise the interpretability of estimated
treatment effects. In particular, the focus of
the time-series literature on executions, as
opposed to the sanctions regime more generally, marks a divergence from the neoclassical model of crime insofar as the occurrence
of an execution does not per se change the
expected severity of a criminal sanction for
murder.34 Indeed the research design is
often motivated by the assumption that an
execution affects an offender’s 
perceived
34 An important exception to this general point can be
found in Chen (2013), which studies the effect of executions for desertion among British soldiers during World
War I and finds evidence that executions deter desertion,
but actually encourage desertion when the execution was
for an offense other than desertion or if the executed soldier was Irish. The reason this study stands as an exception
to the rule proposed by Charles and Durlauf is that during
a time of war, the sanction regime is likely to be in constant
flux.
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sanction. However, there is little evidence,
empirical or otherwise, to support this
assumption. Second, Charles and Durlauf
note that the underlying logic of time-series
analyses of executions and murder operationalize as deterrence the dynamic correlations between a shock to one time series and
the levels of another. As the authors note,
this is an arbitrary conceptualization of what
is meant by deterrence.
A second literature studies the deterrent
effect of capital punishment utilizing panel
data on US states to identify the effect of
a capital-punishment statute or the frequency of executions on murder among the
public at large. In particular, these studies
have exploited the fact that in addition to
cross-state differences in sentencing policy,
there is also variation over time for individual states in the official sentencing regime,
the propensity to seek the death penalty in
practice, and the application of the ultimate
punishment (Chalfin, Haviland, and Raphael
2013). This literature has generated mixed
findings with several prominent papers (e.g.,
Dezhbakhsh, Rubin, and Shepherd 2003;
Mocan and Gittings 2003; Zimmerman
2004, 2006; and Dezhbakhsh and Shepherd
2006) finding large and significant deterrence effects, and several equally prominent papers (Katz, Levitt, and Shustorovich
2003; Berk 2005; Donohue and Wolfers
2005, 2009; and Kovandzic, Vieraitis, and
Paquette-Boots 2009) finding little evidence
in favor of deterrence.35
While evidence in favor of deterrence
is mixed, recent reviews by Donohue and
Wolfers (2005, 2009) and Chalfin, Haviland,
and Raphael (2013), as well as a 2011 report
commissioned by the National Academy of
Sciences, point to substantial problems in a
35 The debate continues with recent responses to
critiques by Donohue and Wolfers (2005) offered by
Zimmerman (2009), Dezhbakhsh and Rubin (2011), and
Mocan and Gittings (2010).
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number of papers that purport to find deterrence effects of capital punishment. These
problems include the use of weak and/or
inappropriate instruments (Dezhbakhsh,
Rubin, and Shepherd 2003; and Zimmerman
2004), failure to report standard errors that
are robust to within-state dependence
(Dezhbakhsh and Shepherd 2006 and
Zimmerman 2009), and sensitivity of estimates to different conceptions of perceived
execution risk (Mocan and Gittings 2003).36
More generally, the panel-data literature
suffers from the threat of policy endogeneity, failure to include accurate controls, and
a lack of knowledge regarding how potential
offenders perceive execution risk. Finally,
as noted by Berk (2005) and Donohue and
Wolfers (2005), results are highly sensitive
to the inclusion of certain states and even
certain influential data points (i.e., Texas in
1997). The most careful paper to date is that
of Kovandzic, Vieraitis, and Paquette-Boots
(2009), who use a dataset spanning a longer
period of time, employ an expanded set of
control variables, and explore a wide variety
of operationalizations of the effect of capital
punishment and execution risk. The authors
find no evidence of a deterrent effect.
4.3 Sanction Nonlinearities
An additional literature that seeks to estimate the magnitude of deterrence effects
does so by exploiting nonlinearities in the
severity of sanctions faced by certain offenders. Typically, these studies estimate the incidence of arrest rates for young offenders who
are either just below or just above the age
of criminal majority—generally either seventeen or eighteen years of age, depending
36 While Mocan and Gittings (2010) provide an extensive
summary of the robustness of results reported in Mocan
and Gittings (2003), Chalfin, Haviland, and Raphael (2013)
point out that the responsiveness of murder to execution
risk relies on the assumption that individuals are executed
fairly soon (within six years) of a conviction.
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on the state. While offenders below a given
state’s age cutoff are adjudicated as juveniles
and face relatively low sanctions risk, offenders who are just above the age of majority
are adjudicated as adults and are subject to
considerably more severe sanctions. Given
that the conditional probability of an arrest is
smooth as a function of age around the age of
criminal majority, any behavioral response of
offenders to the threshold is assumed to be
the result of deterrence.
The canonical paper in this literature is
that of Lee and McCrary (forthcoming).
Using data from Florida, Lee and McCrary
document a sizable discontinuity in the probability that a young offender is sentenced to
prison depending upon whether the arrest
occurred prior to or after the offender’s
eighteenth birthday. Despite the fact that
the expected sentence length for an adult
arrestee is over twice as great as that faced
by a juvenile offender, Lee and McCrary find
little evidence of deterrence. Their estimates
suggest an elasticity of crime with respect to
sentence lengths of approximately −0.05,
an estimate that is far smaller than that of
Drago, Galbiati, and Vertova (2009), who
estimated an elasticity for Italian adults.
Findings in Lee and McCrary are perhaps
surprising, but are supported by results
reported in Hjalmarsson (2009b), who documents that perceived increases in the severity of sanctions at the age of criminal majority
among juvenile offenders are smaller than
the actual changes, thus suggesting a mechanism underlying these small effects. The
implication is that deterrence is not operational because perceptions do not match the
incentives created by public policy.
Lee and McCrary’s research design has
now been replicated to varying degrees.
Most recently, Hansen and Waddell (2014)
study the effect of Oregon’s age of majority on juvenile offending and report some
evidence of a decline in crime upon reaching the age of majority for covered crimes.

However, results that utilize an appropriately
small bandwidth are not significant at conventional levels indicating, at best, weak evidence in favor of deterrence effects. Finally,
in a reduced-form analysis using nationallevel data in the NLSY, Hjalmarsson (2009b)
finds little evidence of deterrence around
state-specific ages of majority using self-reported data on offending.
A final paper worth mentioning is that
of Hjalmarsson (2009b), which studies the
effect of serving time in prison on subsequent arrest among juvenile offenders in
Washington State. Exploiting a discontinuity in the state’s sentencing guidelines,
Hjalmarsson reports that incarcerated juveniles have lower propensities to be reconvicted of a crime. This deterrent effect is also
observed for older and more criminally experienced offenders. The differential findings
in Hjalmarsson (2008), on the one hand, and
Hjalmarsson (2009b) and Lee and McCrary
(forthcoming), on the other hand can potentially be rationalized by the fact that while
the latter studies considered the behavioral
response to a general threat of punishment,
the former study measures the behavioral
response to actual punishment that has
already been experienced.
On the whole, the RD literature around
the age of criminal majority produces little
evidence of deterrence among young offenders. The available evidence suggests that this
may, in part, be due to a lack of awareness of
the size of the sanctions discontinuity, leaving open the possibility that deterrence may
be found if the discontinuity is “advertised”
as in pulling-levers-type focused-deterrence
strategies. A remaining issue concerns the
focus of the literature on arrests, which are
an imperfect proxy for offending. In particular, if police officers are less likely to arrest
an individual just below the age of majority
relative to an individual just above the age
of majority for a given crime, the resulting
RD estimates will be attenuated with respect
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to the actual change in offending, which may
well have been positive. While no direct
evidence suggests that this type of officer
behavior is widely employed, the concern is
worth noting.
4.4 Deterrence versus Incapacitation
As with the literature examining the
response of crime to the certainty of apprehension, the primary conceptual challenge to
interpreting the empirical literature on sanctions is that it is difficult to discern between
deterrence and incapacitation. With respect
to studies of the crime–prison population
elasticity, two issues merit discussion. First,
the size of a state’s prison population is only
a proxy for the punitiveness of the sanctions
regime. In practice, the size of the prison
population is a function of many things: the
underlying rate of offending, the certainty of
punishment (in part due to the probability of
apprehension), and the criminal propensity of
the marginal offender when the prison population changes. Prison population is a stock,
not a flow, and accordingly when the prison
population declines it can be due to either
an increase in the contemporary probability of a custodial sentence or to flows out of
prison (Durlauf and Nagin 2011). Likewise,
deterrence is only one of the mechanisms by
which prisons affect crime, the other being
incapacitation. For these reasons, the literature that examines the crime–prison population elasticity, while important with respect
to public policy, is not particularly informative with respect to deterrence.
In our view, research that studies the
instantaneous impact of shocks to the sanctions regime are considerably more informative. Indeed, identifying the sensitivity of
crime to a shock to the sanctions regime is
conceptually close to testing Becker’s prediction that behavior will respond to the
severity of a sanction. However, even with
perfect identification, attributing a change
in offending that occurs in the aftermath of
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a sanctions shock to deterrence requires a
logical leap. In particular, the logical leap is
greatest when the sanctions regime becomes
more punitive along both the intensive and
extensive margin. To the extent that a custodial sentence becomes both longer and
more likely, tougher sentencing generates
both deterrence and incapacitation effects.
This is an issue in interpreting much of the
literature on sentence enhancements. Such
a concern is addressed in Kessler and Levitt
(1999), which studies the effect of California
Proposition 8, a 1982 ballot amendment that
enhanced the length of sentences for certain
felonies, but not for others. Because prior to
Proposition 8, each of the felonies already
required mandatory prison time, any instantaneous response of crime to Proposition 8
would have to be attributable to deterrence.
Kessler and Levitt find that crimes that
were eligible for the enhancement fell by
between 4 and 8 percent in the aftermath of
Proposition 8, relative to a control group of
crimes not eligible for the enhancement. The
implication of these findings is that increased
sanctions promote substantial deterrence.
However, while the logic is, in general, persuasive, the validity of Kessler and Levitt’s
results have been called into question by
Webster, Doob, and Zimring (2006), who
argue that overall crime did not fall in the
aftermath of Proposition 8, and by Raphael
(2006), who argues that crimes ineligible
for sentence enhancements do not form an
appropriate control group for crimes eligible
for the enhancement.
Changes in a state’s use of capital punishment, in theory, offers a more appropriate means of identifying deterrence. This is
because capital murder is sufficiently serious
as to warrant a long prison sentence regardless of the specifics of a state’s sentencing
regime. Hence, when an offender is sentenced to death (as opposed to a sentence of
life without the possibility of parole), there is
no instantaneous incapacitation effect. With

32

Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. LV (March 2017)

respect to capital punishment, the evidence
of deterrence is, at best, mixed with the most
rigorous studies failing to find evidence of
deterrence. Moreover, the identification
problems in the literature are considerable,
as it is difficult to identify a shock to a state’s
capital-punishment regime that is plausibly
exogenous. Overall, we do not believe this
literature offers any credible evidence of
deterrence, though it is not clear that variation in capital-punishment regimes will ever
be sufficiently random and that murder rates
will ever be sufficiently dense to allow us to
credibly detect a treatment effect.
Undoubtedly the best tests for deterrence
may be found in research that follows individual offenders who, upon being apprehended,
face different sanctions for a given crime.
To the extent that differential treatment is
driven by arbitrary distinctions within the
criminal-justice system, research can identify deterrence by comparing the behavior of
offenders who are otherwise similar but are
treated differently. Such a research design
is truly quasi-experimental in the sense that
treatment effects can be interpreted using
the language of the Rubin causal model.
Moreover, individual-level studies track
the behavior of individuals who are not in
prison and accordingly are not incapacitated.
Hence, any behavioral shift is plausibly attributable to deterrence. These individual-level
studies produce mixed evidence. On the one
hand, studies of three-strikes laws establish
that offenders with two strikes are less likely
to reoffend than offenders with one strike
(Zimring, Hawkins, and Kamin 2001 and
Helland and Tabarrok 2007). Likewise, in
Drago, Galbiati, and Vertova’s study of Italy’s
clemency bill, prisoners who faced harsher
sanctions upon being rearrested were less
likely to be rearrested. On the other hand,
studies of sanction nonlinearities in which
offenders of slightly different ages receive
differential treatment report little evidence
of a large deterrence effect. Of course, these

results might be rationalized by differences
in the responsiveness to a sanction among
offenders of different ages.
To date, the degree to which offenders
are deterred by harsher sanctions remains
an open question. Undoubtedly, deterrence
can exist in extreme circumstances in which
the punishment is immediate and harsh.
Likewise, evidence of deterrence is found
when punishment severity faced by individual offenders is both extraordinarily severe
and known. However, within the range of
typical changes to sanctions in contemporary criminal-justice systems, the evidence
suggests that the magnitude of deterrence
owing to more severe sentencing is not large
and is likely to be smaller than the magnitude
of deterrence induced by changes in the certainty of capture. What is less well understood
is the extent to which changing sentencing
severity along the extensive margin induces
deterrence. Since this increases the severity
of punishment in the near rather than the
distant future, one might think that deterrence effects will be more easily observed.
5.

Work and Crime

The final pillar of the neoclassical model of
crime considers the responsiveness of crime
to a carrot (better employment opportunities) rather than a stick (certainty or severity of punishment). In particular, since the
benefit of a criminal act must be weighed
against the value of the offender’s time
spent in an alternative activity, an increase
in the opportunity cost of an offender’s time
can be thought of as a deterrent to crime.
Indeed, this principle has generated considerable public support for a variety of policies
designed to reduce recidivism among offenders returning from prison—for example, the
provision of job training, employment counseling, and transitional jobs.
The empirical literature examining the
impact of local labor-market conditions on
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crime can be divided into two related but distinct research literatures. The first literature
examines the relationship between unemployment and crime. A second literature
examines the impact of the responsiveness
of crime to wages.37 With respect to both
literatures, approaches to study the effect
of labor markets on crime are varied and
include papers that use individual microdata, as well as state- or county-level variation. Taken as a whole, the literature that
uses aggregate data to disentangle the effect
of economic conditions on crime presents a
mixed picture. In general, results are sensitive to the time period studied, the population under consideration, the type of wage or
unemployment rate that is employed, as well
as the criminal offenses analyzed. However,
more recent and carefully identified papers
tend to find evidence of a fairly robust relationship between both unemployment and
wages and crime. There is also a literature
that examines the relationship between
crime, unemployment, and wages using individual data. We discuss the implications of
this literature for the study of deterrence in
the final part of this section.
5.1 Unemployment
Periods of unemployment are thought to
generate incentives to engage in criminal
activity, either as a means of income supplementation or consumption smoothing or,
more generally, due to the effect of psychological strain (Chalfin and Raphael 2011). To
the extent that a decline in unemployment
raises the opportunity cost of crime without generating a subsequent increase in the
probability of apprehension or the severity of
the expected sanction, the response of crime
37 There is also a large and growing experimental literature that evaluates how at-risk individuals have responded
to the provision of job coaching, employment counseling,
career placement, and other employment-based services.
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to changes in the unemployment rate can
be thought of as capturing, among a host of
behavioral responses, deterrence.
In general, the early literature linking
unemployment and crime has produced
mixed and frequently contradictory results,
leading Chiricos (1987) to characterize scholarly opinion on the topic as a “consensus of
doubt.” In particular, Chiricos found that,
among the studies he reviewed, fewer than
half found significant positive effects of
aggregate unemployment rates on crime
rates.38 This conclusion is echoed in reviews
by Freeman (1983), Piehl (1998), Mustard
(2010), and Chalfin and Raphael (2011).
Recent literature on the topic of unemployment and crime has benefited from
several methodological advances—in particular, the use of panel data as opposed to a
cross-sectional data or national time series.
Examples of panel-data research include
Entorf and Spengler (2000) for Germany,
Papps and Winkelmann (2000) for New
Zealand, Machin and Meghir (2004) for
the United Kingdom, Andresen (2013) for
Canada, and Arvanites and Defina (2006),
Ihlanfeldt (2007), Rosenfeld and Fornango
(2007), and Phillips and Land (2012) for the
United States. With the exception of Papps
and Winkelmann (2000), each of these
papers finds at least some evidence in favor
of a link between unemployment and crime,
in particular, property crime.

38 Nonetheless, Chiricos’s review also found that the
unemployment–crime relationship was three times more
likely to be positive than negative and fifteen times more
likely to be positive and significant than negative and significant, indicating a basis for further research. The results
were especially strong for property crimes—in particular, larceny and burglary. Chiricos suggests that research
results are generally consistent by level of aggregation,
though they tend to be more consistently positive and significant at lower levels of aggregation. This hypothesis is
echoed by Levitt (2001), who likewise argues that nationallevel time-series analyses obscure the unemployment–
crime relationship by failing to account for rich variation
across space.
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A second innovation in the recent literature has been to employ instrumental variables to address the potential endogeneity
between labor-market conditions and crime.
The first such study is that of Raphael and
Winter-Ebmer (2001), who use a state-level
panel data set covering 1979–98 to study
the effect of unemployment rates on various
types of crime employing two instruments for
the unemployment rate—the value of military contracts with the federal government,
as well as the regional impact of shocks to
the price of oil. For property-crime rates, the
results consistently indicate a positive effect
of unemployment on crime with a 1 percentage point increase in the unemployment rate
predicting a 3–5 percent increase in property crime. For violent crime, however, the
results are mixed. Gould, Weinberg, and
Mustard (2002) provide a similar analysis
at the county level, using a county’s initial
industry mix and measures of skill-biased
technical change as an instrument for unemployment. They too find evidence of a positive relationship between unemployment
and crime, particularly property crime. Taken
as a whole, results reported in Raphael and
Winter-Ebmer (2001) and Gould, Weinberg,
and Mustard (2002) imply that variation in
unemployment rates explained between
12 percent and 40 percent of the decline in
property crime during parts of the 1990s. In
a more recent paper, Lin (2008) builds on
these approaches using exchange-rate shocks
to isolate exogenous variation in unemployment rates. Lin reports that a 1 percentage
point increase in unemployment leads to a
4 to 6 percent decline in property crime and
would explain roughly one-third of the crime
drop during the 1990s.39
On the whole, the preponderance of the
evidence suggests that there is an important
39 Fougere, Kramarz, and Pouget (2009) provide a similar analysis for France, finding effects that are similar in
magnitude.

relationship between unemployment rates
and property crime, but little impact of
unemployment on violent crime, a conclusion echoed in a recent review by Cook
(2010). In the recent literature, which is
more careful with respect to addressing
omitted variables bias and simultaneity, the
relationship between unemployment and
property crime is found regardless of the
level of aggregation (counties or states).40
The relationship between unemployment
and property crime is empirically meaningful, as property crime would be predicted to
rise by between 9 and 18 percent during a
serious recession in which unemployment
increased by 3 percentage points. Moreover,
this, if anything, may understate the magnitude of the relationship, as crime appears to
be particularly sensitive to the existence of
employment opportunities for low-skilled
men (Schnepel 2013). Nevertheless, the
estimates remain sensitive to the time period
studied. To wit, property crime has generally continued to decline through the recent
Great Recession, which increased unemployment rates nationally by as many as
4 percentage points.
5.2 Wages
A second and related research literature
considers the impact of wage levels on crime
rates. There are several a priori reasons to
expect a stronger relationship between
40 Prominent IV papers, including Raphael and
 inter-Ebmer (2001); Gould, Weinberg, and Mustard
W
(2002); and Lin (2008) do not uniformly find that instrumenting results in a more positive relationship between
unemployment and crime as would be predicted by the
omission of procyclical control variables or simultaneity bias. Another explanation for slippage between least
squares and IV estimates of the effect of unemployment
on crime is measurement errors in the unemployment rate.
To the extent that such errors are classical, attenuation bias
will mean that 2SLS estimates will exceed ordinary least
squares (OLS) estimates. To the extent that this pattern
is not found, there is the possibility that OLS estimates
are actually upward biased due to simultaneity or omitted
variables.
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crime and wages than between crime and
unemployment. First, as noted by Gould,
Weinberg, and Mustard (2002), since criminal participation is associated with a set of
fixed costs, crime may well be more responsive to long-term labor-market measures
such as levels of human capital or wages than
unemployment spells, which are typically
ephemeral. Second, at any given time, the
number of individuals who are employed in
low-wage jobs vastly outnumbers the number of unemployed and, as such, wages for
unskilled men may play a proportionally
greater role than unemployment in encouraging crime (Hansen and Machin 2002). In
fact, among individuals who reported engaging in crime during the past year, a large
majority reported wage earnings (Grogger
1998) and three-quarters were employed at
the time of their arrest, indicating that the
behavior of a majority of offenders should be
sensitive to changes in the wage.
The literature linking wages to crime has,
in general, generated more consensus than
the unemployment literature. Prominent
panel-data papers include Doyle, Ahmed,
and Horn (1999), who analyze state-level
panels for 1984–93 and find that higher average wages reduce both property and violent
crime (elasticity estimates vary between
−0.3 and −0.9), and Gould, Weinberg, and
Mustard (2002), who restrict their analysis
to the wages of relatively low-skilled men
and find, using a county-level panel spanning 1979 to 1997, that the falling wages
of unskilled men in this period led to an
18 percent increase in robbery, a 14 percent
increase in burglary, and a 7 percent increase
in larceny. These findings are striking in that
they indicate that wage trends explain more
than half of the increase in both violent and
property crimes over the entire period.
In a similar analysis for the United
Kingdom, Machin and Meghir (2004)
examine changes in regional crime rates
in 
relation to changes in the tenth and
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twenty-fifth percentiles of the region’s wage
distribution and focus on the retail sector,
an industry where low-skilled workers have
the ability to manipulate their hours of work.
They find that crime rates are higher in areas
where the bottom of the wage distribution
is low. With regard to microdata, Grogger
(1998), leveraging data from the NLSY, finds
that youth wages account for approximately
three-quarters of the variation in youth

crime. Finally, a related literature considers the responsiveness of crime to minimum
wages and consistently finds evidence in
favor of a negative relationship between the
two variables (Corman and Mocan 2005 and
Fernandez, Holman, and Pepper 2014).
5.3 Individual-Level Studies
In addition to aggregate-level studies
that examine the impact of macroeconomic
fluctuations on crime, there is a parallel
literature that studies the effect of wage
shifts and job loss—mainly job loss—over
the life course. This literature uses natural variation to examine whether offending
rises when individuals find themselves out
of work. An early example of such research
is that of Crutchfield and Pitchford (1997),
who, using data from the 1979 NLSY79,
find that the approximately 8,000 adults
who responded to the first wave of the survey were more likely to engage in crime
when they are out of the labor force and
when they expect their current job to be of
short duration. A host of similar cohort studies have found similar correlations among
males in London, as well as individuals born
in Philadelphia in 1945 (Thornberry and
Christenson 1984 and Witte and Tauchen
1993). For several reasons, we do not believe
this literature has great value in uncovering
deterrence effects. First, even conditioning
on fixed effects, individual-level models do
not plausibly account for omitted variation
that may be related to both unemployment
and offending. In particular, a change in an
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important unobserved factor may drive both
spells out of work and criminal activity. For
example, illegal drug use may simultaneously cause both an unemployment spell as
well as participation in crime. Alternatively,
other life stresses, problems with personal
relationships, mental health problems, etc.
may cause the simultaneous co-occurrence
of unemployment (or underemployment)
and criminal activity (Chalfin and Raphael
2011). To be sure, such issues of causal identification pose a challenge in all micro-level
social science research using observational
data. Nonetheless, absent a clear source of
exogenous variation in employment status or
employment prospects, one should probably
consider these sorts of longitudinal estimates
as providing an upper bound on the likely
effect sizes.
A second individual-level literature is, in
our view, more useful. This literature considers the impact of providing employment
services, or, in some cases, transitional jobs
to former prisoners—in particular assessing
whether such programs reduce recidivism.
The research is predominantly comprised
of randomized experiments and is, as such,
highly credible. Experimental interventions
of this nature tend to include programs that
provide income, employment-based services, or skills-building social services. There
are over a dozen experimental evaluations of
such efforts in the United States, in which
treatment group members are randomly
assigned. A key advantage of these studies
is that the treatment is clearly exogenous,
and, as such, any observed impacts plausibly
represent true causal effects. However, the
reader should be careful in interpreting the
results of these programmatic interventions,
as it is often the case that many members of
the randomized control group receive similar services elsewhere. Often, it is difficult
to document such contamination and it is
not always self-evident that the intervention has a large marginal impact on service

 elivery. Second, since these interventions
d
are targeted at particular groups with offense
histories that cross fairly stringent severity
levels (former prisoners, for example), they
tend to treat individuals who may not be particularly responsive to positive incentives.
Community-based employment interventions became popular in the United States
beginning in the 1970s. Under authority
of the 1962 Manpower Development and
Training Act, the US Department of Labor
launched a number of programs aimed at
former prisoners beginning with the Living
Insurance for Ex-Prisoners program, which
provided a living stipend and job-placement
assistance to prisoners returning to Balti
more between 1972 and 1974, and the
Transitional Aid Research Project (TARP),
which provided various combinations of
cash assistance and job-placement services
to five different experimental groups of
ex-offenders in Georgia and Texas. The earlier demonstration evaluated by Mallar and
Thorton (1978) found significant impacts of
the income-support program, with considerably lower offending rates among the treatment group. However, the evaluation of the
larger-scale TARP program (Rossi, Berk, and
Lenihan 1980) found little effect. The latter
evaluation also found a large negative effect
of the transitional cash assistance on the
labor supply of released inmates. In fact, the
authors speculate that the lack of an overall
impact on recidivism reflected the offsetting
effects of the reduction in recidivism due to
the cash assistance and the increased criminal activity associated with being idle (Rossi,
Berk, and Lenihan 1980).
There have also been several h
 igh-quality
evaluations of the impact of providing transitional employment to former inmates.
The National Supported Work (NSW) program (recently reanalyzed by Uggen 2000)
and the New York Center for Employment
Opportunities currently under evaluation
by the Manpower Development Research

Chalfin and McCrary: Criminal Deterrence: A Review of the Literature
Corporation (MDRC) (Bloom et al. 2007)
find some evidence that providing prison
releases with transitional employment
forestalls recidivism during the two years
post-release. However, these programs
found considerable heterogeneity in program impacts with the NSW, finding significant effects for older releases and the
CEO evaluation reporting significant effects
for only those most recently released from
prison. Moreover, the majority of the literature reports little evidence of an effect of
employment status on recidivism among
reentering prisoners (Visher, Winterfield,
and Coggeshall 2005). It may well be that
employment deters crime among individuals
without prison experience, a mechanism that
plausibly underlies relationships between
measures of macroeconomic performance
and crime. However, among individuals with
serious criminal records, the evidence of
deterrence is difficult to find.
5.4 Identifying Deterrence
A first-order issue in interpreting research
on the effect of police and prisons on crime
concerns the extent to which deterrence
can be disentangled from incapacitation.
This issue is not relevant in considering the
responsiveness of crime to changes in wages
or employment conditions. Nevertheless, it is
worth considering whether a significant coefficient on the wage or unemployment rate
in a crime regression necessarily identifies
deterrence. In particular, for several reasons,
crime and unemployment may be related
due to factors other than deterrence. First,
a relationship between macroeconomic conditions and crime may exist due to the relationship between macroeconomic conditions
and criminal opportunities (Cook and Zarkin
1985). For example, during a recession, auto
thefts tend to decline presumably because
fewer people are employed and therefore
drive their cars less frequently (Cook 2010).
Second, employment conditions and crime
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may be linked through behavioral changes
that cannot be properly characterized as
deterrence. For example, a displaced worker
may well develop feelings of anger or loss of
control that subsequently manifest in violent
behavior. In such a case, the job may not be
protective against crime through any deterrence mechanism per se. Nevertheless, a
robust relationship between economic conditions and crime is potentially consistent
with the idea that individuals respond to
incentives, at least at the margin.
6.

Conclusion

We reviewed three large literatures
regarding the responsiveness of crime to
police, sanctions, and local labor-market
opportunities. Three key conclusions are
worth noting. First, there is robust evidence
that crime responds to increases in police
manpower and to many varieties of police
redeployments. With respect to manpower,
our best guess is that the elasticity of violent crime and property crime with respect
to police are approximately −0.4 and −0.2,
respectively. The degree to which these
effects can be attributed to deterrence as
opposed to incapacitation remains an open
question, though analyses of arrest rates suggests a role for deterrence (Levitt 1998 and
Owens 2013). With respect to deployments,
experimental research on hot-spots policing
and focused deterrence efforts have, in some
cases, led to remarkably large decreases in
offending, a fact that may be attributable to
the visibility of such policies.
Second, while the evidence in favor of a
crime–sanction link generally favors relatively small deterrence effects, there does
appear to be some evidence of more meaningful deterrence induced by policies that
target specific offenders with sentence
enhancements. This is seen in the effect of
California’s three-strikes law on the behavior of offenders with two strikes (see Helland
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and Tabarrok 2007) and in the behavior of
pardoned Italian offenders (Drago, Galbiati,
and Vertova 2009). On the other hand,
while the elasticity of crime with respect to
sentence lengths appears to be large in the
Italian case, it is quite small in the California
case.
Finally, there is fairly strong evidence, in
general, of a link between local labor-market conditions, proxied using the unemployment rate or the wage, on crime. While
these effects are unlikely to be appreciably
contaminated by incapacitation effects, they
may reflect behavioral responses aside from
deterrence. Moreover, it is not clear that supplying employment deters offending among
the most criminally productive individuals.
Overall, the evidence suggests that individuals respond to the incentives that are the
most immediate and salient. While police
and local labor-market conditions influence
costs that are borne immediately, the cost
of a prison sentence, if experienced at all, is
experienced sometime in the future. To the
extent that offenders are myopic or have a
high discount rate, deterrence effects will be
less likely. Moreover, given that an empirical
finding of deterrence depends on the existence of perceptual deterrence, it may be
the case that potential offenders are more
aware of changes in policing and local labormarket conditions than they are of changes
in incarceration policy, with the exception
of specific sentence enhancements that are
individually targeted. In the final section of
this article, we return to Becker’s economic
model of crime in an attempt to rationalize
the empirical literature with the theory that
precipitated it. We close with a couple of
concrete recommendations for future work.
6.1 Rationalizing Theory and Empirics
A natural starting place in reconciling the
empirics with the theory is to consider that
Becker’s model does not explicitly predict
that offending will be more responsive to

changes in pas opposed to f. This is because
while the model allows for varying degrees
of risk aversion, there is no other mechanism
within the model that can lead to a differential response of crime to p
 and fthat we
tend to observe in the empirical literature.
However, using more recent theoretical
work that builds upon Becker as a guide, we
note that there are at least three strong theoretically motivated reasons to expect that
crime will be more responsive to p than to
f. This is not to say that the Becker model
is incorrect—on the contrary, our reading
of the empirical literature is that it provides
support for the model. Instead, we prefer to
characterize the model as a useful starting
point for thinking about some of the more
nuanced aspects of deterrence.
Perhaps the most enduring criticism of the
original neoclassical model is that it is static
and, accordingly, does not explicitly allow
for individuals to differ in their time preferences, a fact that is inspired by a generation
of behavioral economics research and was
noted in early work by Block and Heineke
(1975) and Cook (1980). Dynamic extensions of Becker can be found in Polinsky and
Shavell (1999), Lee and McCrary (forthcoming), and McCrary (2011), among others.
An abbreviated version of such a dynamic
model was presented in section 1 of this
article. The most important insight arising
from the dynamic corollary of Becker is that
individuals who are myopic and engage in
hyperbolic discounting will be more strongly
deterred by changes in p
 , which affect utility immediately, than by changes in f, which,
for the most part, affect utility in the distant
future. To the extent that offenders tend to
be hyperbolic discounters and there is ample
evidence that many are, we should not expect
long sentences to deter to nearly the same
degree as changes in the probability of either
arrest or some type of punishment.
In recent years, the Becker model has
also been augmented to allow for the fact
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that sanctions do not necessarily follow
from apprehension. Indeed, many offenders are arrested but do not suffer anything
more than a trivial criminal sanction, either
because charges are not filed or are dismissed or because a custodial sentence is
not handed down or is considered already
served at the time of sentencing. Likewise,
behavioral scientists have incorporated
the notion that individuals suffer both
legal and nonlegal sanctions when they are
arrested for committing a crime (Nagin and
Paternoster 1994, Nagin and Pogarsky 2003,
and Williams and Hawkins 1986). While the
effect of legal sanctions has been well understood since Becker, the extent to which individuals suffer social stigma and other social
costs as a result of an arrest remains less well
understood. Nagin (2013) formalizes these
related concepts within the framework of
the Becker model, conceptualizing pas the
product of the probability of apprehension,
P a, and the conditional probability of a sanction given apprehension, P 
 (S|a). With these
additions, it can be shown that if individuals
are more sensitive to changes in the probability of apprehension than to changes in
the sanction, it is easy to see that changes
in utility (and thus crime) can potentially be
explained by informal sanction costs alone
(Nagin 2013). A related and arguably more
important insight is that in the event that
informal sanctions costs are very high, it is
considerably more likely that deterrence will
accrue via the probability of apprehension
(p a) than via f.
Related to this is the issue of heterogeneity in individual utility over the legal
sanction. In the event that the stigma of a
custodial sentence declines, the disutility
derived from punishment will fall as a function of the length of an individual’s criminal
history (Durlauf and Nagin 2011 and Nagin,
Cullen, and Jonson 2009). That is, as individuals accumulate a longer criminal record,
the stigma from being labeled a “criminal”
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may lose its effectiveness and thus no longer
represent an important component of the
cost of committing a crime. Likewise, the
disutility of punishment may decline due to
the presence of informal social networks that
develop as a result of an individual’s prison
experience. Hence, to the extent that a large
proportion of crime is committed by repeat
offenders, crime should be more sensitive to
the probability of apprehension than to the
severity of sanction, because repeat offenders have already paid the informal costs associated with being labeled a criminal.
A final extension that merits discussion can
be found in Durlauf and Nagin (2011) who
consider that, in addition to exhibiting strong
time preferences, individuals may have a
great deal of trouble accurately estimating
the risk of apprehension even after updating in response to new information (Anwar
and Loughran 2011). Durlauf and Nagin
develop a model in which p
 is probabilistic
and show that for a fixed sanction, when p
is perceived to be arbitrarily close to either
zero or one (i.e., the probability of apprehension is thought to be either extremely low or
extremely high), the effect of certainty will
be greatest. This follows from the tendency
of individuals to systematically overestimate
the likelihood of rare events (e.g., a terrorist
attack) and underestimate the likelihood of
more common events (e.g., a car accident).
As Durlauf and Nagin note, in a world in
which the perceived probability of detection
is very low, even small changes in that perceived probability can have correspondingly
large effects, thus potentially rationalizing
large behavioral responses to hot-spots policing and deterrence advertising.
The implication that the response of crime
to p
 might be systematically greater than to
fhas far-reaching implications with respect
to public policy. First, given that deterrence
is cheap relative to incapacitation, efficient resource allocation demands a shift in
resources toward more d
 eterrence-intensive
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inputs. Hence, in deciding how to allocate
criminal-justice resources between police
officers and prisons, the available evidence
suggests that money is best spent on police
officers, as well as perhaps on jails that might
be used to detain individuals who receive
short sentences. Second, it may be possible to
reduce the size of the US prison population,
which has grown six-fold over the course of
a generation, without compromising public
safety. Such an idea is strongly supported by
the small crime–prison population elasticities reported by Liedka, Piehl, and Useem
(2006) and Johnson and Raphael (2012), as
well as Lofstrom and Raphael’s recent evaluation of the effects of California’s realignment policy. It is also articulated anecdotally
by the experience of New York State, which
has both reduced its prison population as
well as its crime rate in recent years.
These points are underscored in Kleiman
(2009) and Durlauf and Nagin (2011), among
others, who ask the provocative question as
to whether both imprisonment and crime
can be simultaneously reduced. The answer
to this question lies in the magnitude of the
relevant deterrence elasticities, the specifics
of which are cleverly illustrated in Durlauf
and Nagin, who ask us to consider a world
in which there are two types of criminal
opportunities: desirable opportunities with
corresponding probability of arrest, p 
 0, and
undesirable opportunities with probability of
arrest, p 1. Initially, individuals who encounter a criminal opportunity that is assigned
probabilistically elect to commit a crime
if p > p  ∗, where p  ∗  > p 1 > p 0. Hence,
all available opportunities are acted upon.
Durlauf and Nagin next ask us to consider
that p 0 and p 1are each increased by a factor gsuch that g p 0 < p  ∗ < g p 1. In this
world, only the desirable opportunities will
be acted upon. The obvious result is that
crime declines as all of the opportunities
are no longer attractive. What is less obvious is that clearance rates fall by construc-

tion and, accordingly, so do the number of
arrests and subsequent incarcerations. As
shown in Blumstein and Nagin (1978), if the
magnitude of either the elasticity of crime
with respect to por fis less than 1, then the
decline in the crime rate associated with an
increase in pand fwill not be sufficiently
large to avoid an increase in the incarceration
rate. The key then is to determine whether
there are policies that satisfy this inequality
or, in the absence of such policies, identify
policies that decrease severity but have large
elasticities with respect to p. In our view,
swift-and-certain sanctions regimes such as
that motivated by HOPE and visible police
presence are two such policies that seem
especially promising.
6.2 Directions for Future Research
As each of the deterrence literatures has
matured, researchers can begin to focus
less attention on standard identification
problems and more attention on identifying
mechanisms. This is not to say that causal
identification is unimportant. On the contrary—we believe it is as important as it
ever was. However, in the past decade, great
strides have been made in selecting strategies
that credibly identify the causal effects of a
variety of policies which has, in turn, generated a consensus on the range of effects that
can be expected to accrue from a given type
of intervention. For several literatures that
have generated no such consensus (e.g., capital punishment), we strongly suspect that
there is little progress to be made in rehashing the same state-level data. Accordingly,
we provide three recommendations to guide
future work.
First, there is a large and growing literature that supports the deterrence value
of hot-spots policing and, in particular, the
importance of a visible police presence.
However, the evidence on the effects of
disorder policing is more mixed and the
idea remains highly controversial. The best
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evidence suggests that cleaning up physical disorder is important, but it is not clear
whether broken-windows policing is a necessary ingredient to this strategy. Given the
inherent risks of broken-windows policing
that accrue to both officers and citizens and
the civil-rights concerns that are intrinsic in
such a strategy, future research is needed
to identify the extent to which broken windows reduces crime and, if so, whether those
reductions are due to deterrence or incapacitation. There continues to be substantial disagreement on this topic and, while
we are skeptical of the deterrence value of
broken windows, our reading of the research
literature is that we do not yet have sufficient information to make an informed
recommendation.
Second, while evidence is building that
swift-and-certain sanctions can deter offending at dramatically lower costs for both society
and offenders, the idea requires additional
testing. In particular, the conditions under
which such programs work and the degree
to which they are replicable and scalable
remains unknown. It has been suggested that
the success of such programs often depends
on the existence of effective leaders and an
unusual degree of cooperation among local
policy makers. Moreover, swift-and-certain
sanctioning only works if offending can be
reliably detected in the first place.
A third area that, in our view, will benefit
from greater research, concerns the deterrence value of investments in private precautions by potential victims. Evaluations
of LoJack (Ayres and Levitt 1998) and
business improvement districts (Cook and
MacDonald 2011) establish that private
investments can deter (after all, they cannot incapacitate). However, we know relatively little about the effects of other types
of private behavior, such as investments in
burglary alarm systems, the emergence of
various smart phone apps that provide information, as well as other types of technology.
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In closing, we note that Gary Becker’s
recent passing prompts us to acknowledge
yet again the decisive impact of his landmark
1968 paper. As his ubiquity in this review
makes clear, his insights launched an entire
literature—one that has had and continues to have profound implications for, and
impact on, public policy and safety.
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